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Introduction
Today's businesses and home consumers have spent vast amounts ofmoney and financial
resources on e-business commerce and enterprise solutions. These solutions and their
associated applications are designed to acquire and build customer associations that allow
business to grow, from both corporate and personal consumer perspectives. E-business
and the Information Technology industry have grown dramatically over the last two
decades allowing businesses to expand into the cyber-tech world of the Internet. In a
short period of time, this technological development has permitted computer
communications through vast networks used for entertainment, business, and services.
For these networks to operate, specific standards that allow communication to take place
are necessary. These standards have changed dramatically as the type of information that
is transmitted has changed. Communications involving merely voice and data are no
longer sufficient. Today, communication systems that include image and video are
essential. This type of information sharing has created new technologies that allow data
transfer to support many hardware and software distributed systems.
TCP/IP is a protocol that is part ofa communication standard that defines the
groundwork for the Internet. There are other communication standards, but almost all
computer and software vendors now utilize the TCP/IP protocol as part of an overall
network that handles communications between computers. These standards permit basic
services such as electronic mail, file transfer, and remote login capabilities across large
numbers of client/server systems to, ultimately, provide end users with the ability to
communicate and share datawith virtually anyone connected to a computer network. As
much as this protocol provides increased communication capabilities, it has a down side.
Ranges of inherent problems have surfaced ~ from the system being fragile to external
threats arising from unauthorized use of this protocol to access business and personal
computers. The original concept of the Internet was an information-sharing medium. The
development of this medium was shared among a few parties, the government and
selected universities. It was essentially architected to transmit data. The complexities
seen with today's Internet evolved from these original concepts. They also incorporate
updates that address critical problems that developed through Internet usage.
The biggest concern for today's user is security. Because the Internet was not designed
with security in mind, it contains many openings for intrusions. As development
continued, changes were made to address these concerns, but the rapid growth of Internet
usage prevented wholesale fixes from taking place in a timeframe that warranted secure
implementation. Instead, something new needed to be devised that would address
security along with other outstanding issues such as bandwidth and addressing. This
solution was a new architected version of the Internet, known as IPv6. This version is to
replace IPv4, which is currently in use. One of
IPv6'
s main intentions is to address
security issues by incorporating embedded security that can solve many of the common
privacy and encryption problems to which the current IPv4 is subject. The goal of this
thesis is to explore the aspects of this new architecture in relation to the old, and to
determine whether or not Internet security issues can be minimized or even eliminated
solely by the implementation of IPv6.
Networks
Computer interoperability is the manner in which computers work together as a
networked system. For computers to work together, they need to share resources
connected together with software and hardware components thatmake up a network. The
guidelines that these networks follow are known as standards (expected performance of
all networked elements) and protocols (interaction of these elements). Network
architectures can be designed inmanyways depending upon client needs. After
establishing client requirements, then the type ofnetwork can be determined, from
software operating systems to the software programs needed to allow communication
between the hardware components of the system. The Internet utilizes these components
in the same network model. Internet communication access is based upon the TCP/IP
protocol and is readily used bymany computer systems as their standard networking
protocol. Because of the flexibility of the TCP/IP protocol, other protocols such as
Apple's File Protocol, Microsoft NetBIOS, andNovell IPX can still be used. As indicated
earlier, networks can be constructed in many different fashions depending upon the
architectural requirements of the system. Examples ofdifferent networked systems are
shown below:
LAN's - A small number to many individual computer clients connected to a
centralized computer (server). The server can be equippedwith specific software
that is shared among individual clients as well as specialized applications that
monitor and manage additional programs.
Ethernet - These systems are computers interconnected by cabling that run from
one Ethernet interface card to another Ethernet interface card on another
computer. More often than not, Ethernet cards are locatedwithin the computer
expansion slots and are connected at the interface pointwhere the cable connector
snaps into place. These cables may be attached to a hub (made for the various
media types) that, depending upon signaling architecture, can accommodate up to
a gigabit signal transmission rate.
Token-Ring - This network configuration connects the computers and peripherals
to separate wiring hubs. One disadvantage of a Token-Ring configuration is that,
ifpower or connection is lost, the device will be disconnected from the system.
StructuredWiring - This type ofwiring system provides a standardized system
for wiring a building to accommodate all types ofnetworks. Cabling can be
located in panels located in a centralized area for access that expands out to
specific network connections in wall jacks as designed.
Peer-to-Peer - This type ofnetwork does not contain a dedicated server, but
instead shares the processes of the networked clients. File server programs can
still be loaded and utilized, but they are resident on one of the networked
computers and utilize the resources dictated by the user using that particular
computer. This type ofnetwork makes it easy for others to share resources and
can be economically satisfying if the system remains relatively small.
Enterprise - These systems provide an overall management system that utilizes
software programs called agents to gather information in a format known as a
MIB. This information is transferred to additional programs, which can
comprehend the information on overall system performance and create
informative displays in detailed graphical formats such as charts and graphs.
Enterprise networks can also be used to detect problems by watching for specific
conditions that exceed specified limits; inventory existing systems by gathering
statistics on data transfer, perform data backups, and alert the appropriate system
administrators in case ofbreaches.
Network Communications
The telegraph, using Morse Code as it's means of sending communications, key- punch
terminals, and Baudot's teletypewriter code are the beginnings to today's ASCII code. It
is widely accepted, but not necessarily universal in it's acceptance as a network code.
IBM developed and still uses their own code, EBCDIC in currentmainframes and
computers. With increased computer availability and subsequent usage, it became
apparent that they needed to work together as synchronized units. Continued
development began spawning new technologies such as the Internet. Original intentions
of the Internet, first proposed by the ARPA and later developed by the DARPA l, were
designed as a testingmethod for sending packets of information over networks. As the
ARPA network, or ARPANET continued to develop, modifications allowed for increased
usage, and expanded from predominant military use to commercial venues such as
universities. This work led to the development of an early protocol, the network control
program, and later became TCP/IP 2. Quickly it was evident that the network could not
handle the amount ofnetwork traffic it began receiving. It was also apparent that
Network Administrators became reluctant to share their network resources because of
concerns about security. Clearly, common technologies, or standards needed to be
introduced to allow communication between different networks. The early 1970's
showed how new communication functionality could be connected, regardless of the
operating system platform. The ITU-T, along with the ISO, ARPA, and DARPA,
developed the initial concepts ofnetworking. These standards would allow any computer
to be connected from any location to the network. TCP/IP in the current version 4, was
standardized by the early 1980's. During this timeframe, BerkeleyUniversity released a
version of the TCP/IP protocol and made it available as public software. Because this
software was not proprietary, both public and private sectors adopted it quickly. Many of
today's versions of the TCP/IP protocol have their origins from the Berkeley University
release, as it soon became the standard for data communications protocols.
Rapid development of the Internet forced the development oforganizations to monitor
expansion and maintain control. These organizations, or bodies, such as the IETF
establish guidelines
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that protocols follow regarding implementation as well as standards
for fiiture research. The IETF is composed of an open international community of
network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of
the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet. The IETF is broken
down into working groups and managed by Area Directors that are members of the
Internet Engineering Steering Group. The Area Directors that provide architectural
oversight is known as the LAB. The LAB also oversees appeals when there are registered
complaints. The IANA is the central coordinator for the assignment ofunique parameter
values for Internet protocols. The IANA is chartered by the ISOC to act as the
clearinghouse to assign and coordinate the use ofnumerous Internet protocol parameters.
Within the LETF working group are specific areas and charters that are followed. There
are 8 areas that form this group: Applications, General, Internet, Operations and
Management, Routing, Security, Sub-IP, and Transport. Each of these areas is
responsible for a specific aspect of the Internet. For example, the Operations and
Management working group area houses (or holds or contains) additional sub-areas.
These areas are assigned to specific groups who will oversee them. V6ops is one such
area. The charter
4
of the v6ops work group is as follows:
The global deployment ofLPv6 is underway, creating an LPv4/LPv6 Internet
consisting ofLPv4-only, LPv6-only and LPv4/LPv6 networks and nodes. This
deploymentmust be properly handled to avoid the division of the Internet into
separate IPv4 and IPv6 networks while ensuring global addressing and
connectivity for all IPv4 and IPv6 nodes. The v6ops develops guidelines for the
operation of a shared LPv4/LPv6 Internet and provides guidance for network
operators on how to deploy IPv6 into existing LPv4-only networks, as well as into
new network installations.
The v6ops working group will:
1 . Solicit input from network operators and users to identify operational or
security issues with the LPv4/LPv6 Internet, and determine solutions or
workarounds to those issues. This includes identifying standards work that is
needed in other LETF WGs or areas and working with those groups/areas to begin
appropriate work. These issues will be documented in Informational or BCP
RFC's, or in Internet-Drafts. For example, important pieces of the Internet
infrastructure such as DNS, SMTP and SLP have specific operational issues when
they operate in a shared LPv4/LPv6 network. The v6ops WG will cooperate with
the relevant areas andWGs to document those issues, and find protocol or
operational solutions to those problems.
2. Provide feedback to the IPv6 WG regarding portions of the IPv6 specifications
that cause, or are likely to cause, operational or security concerns, and work with
the IPv6 WG to resolve those concerns. This feedbackwill be published in
Internet-Drafts or RFC's.
3. Publish Informational RFC's that help application developers (within and
outside the LETF) understand how to develop LP version-independent
applications. This working group will work with the Applications area, among
others, to ensure that these documents answer the real-world concerns of
application developers. This includes helping to identify IPv4 dependencies in
existing LETF application protocols and working with other areas and/or groups
within the LETF to resolve them.
4. Publish Informational or BCP RFC's that identify potential security risks in the
operation of shared LPv4/LPv6 networks, and document operational practices to
eliminate or mitigate those risks. This work will be done in cooperation with the
Security area and other relevant areas or working groups.
5. Publish Informational or BCP RFC's that identify and analyze solutions for
deploying IPv6 within common network environments, such as ISP Networks
(including Core, HFC/Cable, DSL & Dial-up networks), EnterpriseNetworks,
UnmanagedNetworks (Home/Small Office), and Cellular Networks. These
documents should serve as useful guides to network operators and users
regarding how to deploy IPv6 within their existing IPv4 networks, as well as in
new network installations.
6. Identify open operational or security issues with the deployment scenarios
documented in (5) and fully document those open issues in Internet-Drafts or
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Informational RFC's. Theywill work to find workarounds or solutions to basic,
IP-level operational or security issues that can be solved usingwidely applicable
transitionmechanisms, such as dual-stack, tunneling or translation. If the
satisfactory resolution of an operational or security issue requires the
standardization of a new, widely-applicable transitionmechanism that does not
properly fit into any other LETF WG or area, the v6ops WG will standardize a
transitionmechanism to meet that need.
7. Assume responsibility for advancing the basic IPv6 transition mechanism
RFC's along the standards track, if their applicability to common deployment
scenarios is demonstrated in:
TransitionMechanisms (RFC 2893)
SET (RFC 2765)
NAT-PT (RFC 2766)
6to4 (RFC 3056 & 3068)
This includes updating these mechanisms, as needed, to resolve problems. In
some cases, these mechanisms maybe deprecated (i.e. moved to Historic), if they
are not found to be applicable to the deployment solutions described in (5) or if
serious flaws are encountered that lead us to recommend against their use. IPv6
operational and deployment issues with specific protocols or technologies (such
as Applications, Transport Protocols, Routing Protocols, DNS or Sub-IP
Protocols) are the primary responsibility of the groups or areas responsible for
those protocols or technologies. However, the v6ops group will provide input to
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those areas/groups, as needed, and cooperate with those areas/groups in
developing and reviewing solutions to LPv6 operational and deployment
problems5.
As ofAugust, 2003 this group had only one RFC, 3574. RFC's are papers designed as
information to be used by the Internet community. They are not in themselves a standard,
but are used as a reference in helping to develop Internet standards.
This organization has become vital as other organizations utilizing the TCP/LP protocol
began developing their own networks. The NSF established a network that was managed
jointly byMCI, Sprintlink, and LBM. With this cooperative effort came the formation of
ANS, which developed access to the Internet by using NAP. This allowed connection to
multiple networks in both public and private sectors. Since the initial design of the
Internet did not anticipate the popularity and wide spread usage that occurred, ANS
became vital. It was also important because it began to address the problem of electronic
security intrusions, which were not anticipated with the initial design.
As the popularity of the Internet grew, so did the potential for unwanted access to computer
systems. For a myriad of reasons, intruders began discovering ways to exploit software and the
networks that tie them together. Controlling specific computers allowed intruders to mask their
true identities and launch attacks through donor computers, causing damage by changing data or
destroying components such as hard drives. Having the latest anti-virus software and operating
system patches can minimize these risks, but will not totally eliminate them. These fixes do help
in detection, but they onlymask the root cause of security design deficiencies. A change in the
way information is delivered was needed as a step towards protecting data. As the current
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TCP/LP protocol continues to evolve, many of the inherent risks associated with it can be
removed.
Still that does not alleviate issues surrounding current networked systems. In today's
environment the majority of attacks on systems come from a relatively small number of software
vulnerabilities. Attackers can be generally counted on to take the easiest, most exploited route,
using very sophisticated tools to compromise a system. Often, they search the Internet for
vulnerable systems, attacking indiscriminately.
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Network Transmission Methods
Network transmission refers to the technology and lines that carry the data information.
Digital services such as ISDN and DSL use existing telephone networks. Other common
examples include coaxial cable modems, which transmit and receive data over local TV
cables, twisted pair (including shielded), and fiber optic. These types ofdata transmission
lines use devices such as hubs, switches, repeaters, bridges, and routers to direct and
provide different levels ofdata handling over the network. Essentially, this allows
applications on personal computers to engage, transfer, and deliver voice, fax, and data
information to other personal computers. Each device has a specific role in delivering the
information to its desired location while maintaining the integrity of the original message.
These devices, also known as portal devices, are used as points in a network to monitor
and detect incoming breaches, but also pose potential links that can be vulnerable to
security intrusions. Exploring each component, the mediums that carry the information,
and the information itself (electromagnetic signals) that makeup a network can expose
security vulnerabilities that exist within each component of the network.
Data communications media that travel these differentmediums can be categorized in the
form ofguided or unguided. Guidedmedia carry electromagnetic signals along hardware
such as coaxial cables, twisted pair, and optical fiber. Unguidedmedia deals with (or
encompasses) wireless communications. The quality ofdata transmissions is dependent
upon the medium used and the characteristics of the electromagnetic signal. Both
transmissions have characteristics that can impact the transmission quality. In guided
mediums, the medium is more critical to the quality of the transmission than the
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electromagnetic signal. For unguided media, the signal strength is more critical than the
transmitting medium. There are basic factors that are key to determining correct
transmission systems:
Bandwidth - generally the greater the bandwidth, the greater the signal quality
Impairments - can limit signal distance
Interference - overlapping signals can impact or destroy signals
Receivers - multiple receivers can introduce additional signal distortion
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Mediums
The physical aspect of twisted pairmediums consists of two insulated copper wires
twisted together in a spiral. These are then bundled together by the hundreds into a
shielded cable. They have a twisted characteristic because it tends to reduce interference
between other twisted pairs contained within the cable. Today, twisted pair is the most
commonmedium used for both analog and digital transmissions. It is used extensively in
telephone and office networks as well as private residences that are connected to the local
telephone exchanges. The original concept of the twisted pair was to support voice traffic
using analog signals, but with the advent of the modem, digital signaling can be
transmitted along these wires. Digital signaling is common in offices that use local-area
networks to support computer systems. Data rates can vary with twisted pair wiring with
common transfer rates of approximately 10 Mbps to high-end rates of approximately 100
Mbps for very short distances. There are many factors that can determine rates from
geographic distances to the number ofdevices connected to the network.
Twisted pair wiring has limitations that need to be considered. Distances of 5kilometers
ormore require amplifiers for analog signals and distances of2 kilometers ormore
require repeaters for digital signals. Interference and noise can also impact signal strength
and clarity. This impedance can be overcome with shielding ofmetallic braid or
sheathing that surrounds the wire. Because twisted pair wiring is available in different
shielded and unshielded categories, design needs to be taken into consideration to
thoroughly understand the network requirements and types ofperipherals thatwill be
connected.
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Coaxial cables are constructed differently than twisted pair and allow a greater number of
frequencies to be transmitted. Both analog and digital signals can be transmitted at higher
frequencies and data transfer rates than typical twisted pair wiring. Essentially, coaxial
cable is a single copper inner wire surrounded by a conductor and shielded with an outer
layer for protection. This outer protection, or shielding, offers greater interference
protection than is offered by twisted pair wiring. Coaxial cabling offers a large variety of
applications, from television and telephone systems to networked computer systems. The
advantages of coaxial cables include the ability to provide high-speed data transfer to a
large number ofdevices over shorter distances such as local building complexes. For
longer distances coaxial cables are similar to twisted pair in that they require amplifiers
for analog signals and repeaters for digital signals. Both twisted pair and coaxial cables
are limited only by the inherent physical characteristics they possess.
Optical fiber technology, as opposed to twisted pair and coaxial cabling has created a
networking breakthrough in communication systems. Its characteristics permit long-range
communications with the associated benefits ofgreater capacity from a reduced cost
base. Optical fibers consist ofa thin, flexible medium (fibers that are made from various
gasses and plastic materials) that transmits an optical impulse. These fibers are
constructed by creating a core (two mediums that have different refraction
characteristics) surrounded by cladding and a protective outer jacket. Optical cabling
contains many independent fibers in a single package with far superior performance
characteristics than seen in twisted pair and coaxial cables.
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The advantages of fiber optic over twisted pair and coaxial mediums range from:
Capacity - Increased bandwidth, allowing data rates of2 Gbps overmany
kilometers have been achieved as compared to 100' s ofMbps over a distance of
up to 2 kilometers for coaxial cable and a fewMbps over a distance ofup to a
single kilometer for twisted pair.
Size and Cost - Considerably smaller in size, it can translate into greatly reduced
structural requirements creating cost savings during installation. Optical fiber
does not require as many repeaters within the network.
Interference - Fiber optic is not impacted by electromagnetic fields so
interference and noise are greatly reduced.
Security - Fiber optic provides a much higher degree of security because it is
difficult to intercept transmissions without detection in the typical constructs used
in point-to-point mediums.
As networked systems continue to evolve, fiber optic technologies will become more
prevalent. They are increasingly being used in the telephone industry due to the benefits
of increased bandwidth capacity and greater route distances. The greater bandwidth
allows for greater capacity to handle the increased demand for voice, data, image, and
video transfer. The greater distance means localized networked systems do not need the
added repeaters seen in twisted pair and coaxial systems. Finally, the increased security
of fiber optic cabling far outweighs the vulnerabilities exhibited by twisted pair and
coaxial cables.
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Other technologies such as wireless (radio, microwave, and satellite) do exist, but they
present a completely different set of security issues. For the purposes of this discussion,
the focus will be on guidedmediums such as twisted pair, coaxial and fiber optic cabling,
since the Internet, as used today, is predominantly using these types ofmediums .
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Electromagnetic Signals
All forms ofdata transmission, either by voice, data or video use electromagnetic signals
that are transmitted over their corresponding medium. The information is created by a
source such as a computer terminal. The information is converted into an electromagnetic
signal, and then carried over a transmission medium, such as fiber optic cable, from the
transmitter to the receiver. The receiver then retrieves the electromagnetic signal and
reproduces it into the original (or approximate) form in which the information was sent
(Figure 1).
Electromagnetic Signal (Data Transmission)
A ?
Transmitter
or
Receiver
Transmitter
or
Receiver
Transmission
Information (Computer) Medium (Cable) Information (Computer)
Figure 1 - Example ofData Transmission
Electromagnetic signals (either analog or digital) can be looked at from two different
perspectives. The first such perspective, time-domain, is a function of time. An analog
signal is a continuously varying electromagnetic wave that is sent over a period of time.
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The wave of the analog signal is made up of three components:
Amplitude - strength of the signal
Frequency - rate at which the signal repeats itself. The range of frequencies is
known as the spectrum of the signal.
Phase - position in time within a single period ofa signal
There are no breaks in an analog signal whereas a digital signal maintains a constant level
for a period of time then changes to another constant level for a period of time. The
second such perspective is a digital signal that is represented by electromagnetic pulses
represented by two binary digits, 0 and 1. The wavelength is the distance of a single cycle
and the bandwidth of a signal is the width of the spectrum. This information is critical
because there is a direct relationship between the amount of information, and capacity of
a signal and its bandwidth. Essentially, the greater the bandwidth, the greater the amount
of information that can be transmitted. There is one downside to consider with
bandwidth; the greater it is, the greater the associated cost. Mediums transfer information
at different rates and, depending upon whichmedium is being utilized, will dictate
bandwidth allocation and information transfer. Most business networks have associated
costs that prohibit unlimited spending. This can dictate how a specific network will be set
up. It will also dictate bandwidth size and data transfer. Limited bandwidths will limit
signal strength, which can potentially create distortions or noise. These distortions, or
noise, canmake it difficult for the receiver to interpret the signal.
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Portal Devices
Portal devices such as bridges, routers, gateways, and repeaters connect local area
networks together and extend the distance capabilities of the network. Each of these
components offers different degrees ofdata handling capabilities within a network.
Bridges are devices that connect networks, filter data packets, and move them forward in
the network. Bridges operate within the Data Link Layer of the OSI Model. They can
read the specific physical addresses ofdevices on the network and filter the information
before moving it forward to another network segment. Because they operate at the Data
Link Layer or, more specifically, at the MAC sub-layer, they can clean an incoming
signal, amplify it and pass it onto the next segment as a clean signal (eliminating signal
noise). This filtering capability allows bridges to scan and reduce traffic between
segments, generating a greater degree of security by selecting the specific data signals, or
packets, that need to be sent. Specific applications ofnetwork architectures require
different types ofbridges. The following are examples of these bridges:
Translating Bridges - These bridges link to similarMAC layer protocols. In cases
where physical addressing is similar, bridges can be developed to link between
MAC layer protocols that are not identical. An example of this would be a bridge
connecting an Ethernet network to a Token Ring network.
Learning Transparent Bridge - Has the capabilities to identify each network
segment and creates address tables that originate from that specific network
segment.
22
Local Bridges - These are bridges that have a local area network connected on
each side. If a bridge links a network over a wide area, it is referred to as a remote
bridge. Each of these bridges has varying capabilities as far as transmitting data
bandwidth. Remote bridges generally operate with lower bandwidth capabilities
than local bridges.
Routers can provide greater control ofdata flow to a network as they become more
complex. Routers operate at the Network layer of the OSI model. It works by opening the
data packet delivered at the MAC layer and determines the routing destination by the
information supplied. This additional work supplied by the router requires more
processor time, memory, and network connections. Typical routers can support many
protocols simultaneously, but this can lead to increased use ofmultiple third party routers
on the network.
Routers work by forwarding a data packet to the appropriate network destination
determined by the table of information that was created when the information was
received. There are two types of tables that are created by the router, static and dynamic.
The static table is updatedmanually as the network is modified while the dynamic table
updates automatically as routers communicate via the RIP. This communication becomes
important as networks continue to develop with increased data transfer speeds. As router
technology develops, the ability to analyze data transfer onmultiple network paths can
provide added functionality for network load balancing and data backups. This
functionality increases the ability to identify individual work groups as subnets, allowing
for control ofmcorning and exiting datawithin the subnets and providing the greater
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security controls needed to circumvent data intrusions. Security preventionmay be as
simple as applying password protection that restricts access to a particular network,
workstation, or server, ormay be as elaborate as using filters to limit access to specific
routers subnets.
Gateways operate at all levels of the OSI model. They can provide content conversions
betweenmultiple environments and applications. Gateways contain both hardware and
software components and provide both conversion and routing duties and can support full
examination ofdata packet transfer. In other words, they can be used in situations to
connect a network that contains different platforms and requires data translation or other
application support. Examples may include connecting PC based workstations to a
mainframe computer or connection ofdifferent mail based systems that are allowed to
communicate with one another. There are different types ofgateways that, depending
upon the system architecture, can be used.
Repeaters amplify the electronic signal from one network segment to another. They are
connected to similar segments that transmit similar data signals. Repeaters operate at the
Physical Layer of the OSI Model and are not impacted by high-level protocol layers.
From a basic perspective, the purpose of a repeater is to extend the physical length of a
network segment. This remains one of the primary benefits, but there are potential issues
such as:
Repeaters don't filter out signal noise, so noise is amplified and sent with the
signal. Because this problem exists, there is generally a limit on the number of
repeaters that are used in a network segment.
24
As signals are generated over large distances, time delays can occur which can
generate timeout errors - keeping repeaters from being used for remote links.
They do not help in reducing network traffic loads.
25
Internets
As mentioned earlier,
DARPA'
s program helped introduce and develop the Internet, as
we are accustomed to today. RFC 760 8, published in January, 1980, was one of the
earlier specifications that helped define the Internet. It was based upon five earlier
versions of the ARPA Internet Protocol Specification. This specification describes the
Internet Protocol as an interconnected system ofpacket-switched computer
communications networks. Essentially, the Internet is a conglomerate of local area
networks connected together bywhat is known as multiple 45-622 Mbps backbone
circuits that are provided by a few dozen carriers across the continental United States.
This system is considerably larger if considered (or looked at) from a worldwide
perspective. There are fourmajor access points in the continental United States along
withmultiple Metropolitan Area Exchanges where these circuits connect. From these
points are hundreds ofother carriers that interconnect at hundreds ofpoints along these
routes. Each of these carriers has redundant connections to points within the United
States and points around the world. As these carriers continue to expand, network
capacity increases, as does its ability to comprehend network failures and disasters.
26
Internet Service Providers
Carriers, or Internet Service Providers, use digital lines such as telephone lines from a
local telephone company or cable lines leased from local cable companies to connect to
the backbone circuits. This is a convenient and relatively inexpensive way to reach the
'
end users. There are currently other vendors that are laying miles uponmiles of fiber
optic cabling, which at some point will replace the currentmediums being used. Until
that point, however, existing ISP's will continue to utilize present resources until the cost
differentials force a change.
ISP's are comprised of telecommunications corporations such as telephone and cable
corporations, and others that are specialized in the Internet business. They compete with
each other to provide the end users Internet access. They provide high-speed connections
to a backbone circuit along with hundreds ofother lower speed connections to assure end
users access when needed. The following diagram (Figure 2) depicts how an ISP might
work.
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Figure 2 - Example ofHow an ISP Might Work
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Domains
The structure of the Internet's naming convention, or LP addressing, can be cumbersome
to both remember and use. Business organizations have adopted the use of acronyms to
identify LP addresses. These acronyms represent a network device and can be easier to
remember than an LP address. For this concept to work, a framework needs to be
developed to map these names to their associated LP addresses. Originally, this
frameworkwas organized by the SRINetwork Information Center. 9 Theymanaged the
specified names in a file called Host.txt that listed the names of the networks and
gateways along with their associated LP addresses. This process worked adequately in the
beginning of Internet usage, but as it grew, being able to administer this file became a
huge (challenging, overwhelming task) job requiring large resources. To deal with this
problem adequately, a system known as the DNS was devised. This system uses a
hierarchical scheme to control the naming conventions. The advantage of this system is
that it allows administrators the ability to manage network devices at a specific level of
the hierarchy. For instance, a domain might have a subdomain as part of its tree, allowing
the administrators to assign and control the rights without impacting other domains.
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Figure 3 - Example of a DNS Structure
The example in Figure 3 is a representation ofa hierarchical structure of a DNS that may
exist somewhere in the Internet. The Root is the highest-level domain level of the tree
represented by ORG (organizations not otherwise identified by other domains), MLL
(military organizations), EDU (educational institutions), GOV (government), ARPA
(arpanet), COM (commercial enterprises), and Con (countries using the ISO standard).
Each of these root domains have subdomain levels of the tree which represent different
companies such as CompanyA, CompanyB, etc. that represent zones of the domain.
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Name servers have the responsibility ofcontrolling specific zones ormultiple zones and,
for the most part, containing their own database structure. Name servers interact with
other name servers by sending queries back and forth via TCP, which at the moment
provides the greatest reliability and efficiency. The next subdomain level in the tree
shows Company E with Bob, Sam, and Joe representing specific domains within the
company structure. This level of the domain is the lowest level of the domain structure
and is known as the leafnode because there are no dependencies associated with the
domains. The DNS naming convention requires each name to be unique within the
specific hierarchical level, but can use repetitive names in different layers. A major
advantage of the DNS systems is that it gives the administrator the ability to set
permissions and specific rights to specific domains as needed. The ability to manage
these domains helps increase security by setting access rights and locking down end users
and by controlling incoming and outgoing network traffic. Other advantages ofDNS is its
ability to support mail applications as well as containing information about local
operating systems, device hardware, and specific applications that are being used.
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Communication Architectures
Communication architectures allow a wide range of computermakes, models, and
operating systems to communicate across a network ormany networks. Architecture
standards are based upon the very simple requirement that systems need to transfer data.
Essentially, they are manufacturer's concepts for networking their devices together.
From a simplistic viewpoint, a communication network consists of at least two
communications centers (computers) and a medium to connect them. These computers
and medium connections have associated tasks for which they are responsible. For
example, Computer A will initiate a command to the network indicating a need to open a
communication link to Computer B. File management applications on Computer A
ascertain that Computer B is ready to accept a data transfer and needs to be prepared for
file storage after it has been received. Once both systems agree on transmission and data
integrity, file transfer takes place. This illustrates thatmany steps (or functions) need to
take place for a successful exchange ofdata. These individual processes can be
implemented as a single command, or can be broken down into different commands and
implemented independently from each other. In this example, these tasks can be broken
down into three tasks, which are structured modules. These modules implement
communications functions and are referred to as a protocol architecture as depicted in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4 - Protocol Architecture
The three-layermodel is organized as follows: network access, transport, and application.
These layers are somewhat independent with feature sets particular to each.
The network access layer focuses on the exchange ofdata between the computer and
network. Characteristics of this layer include providing network addresses andmay
include specialized services such as priorities. The transport layer verifies that the data
arrives in the same order it was sent. The application layer contains the software needed
to support any applications involved in the transfer, such as file transfer. These layers
illustrate how network tasks can be broken apart into individual tasks, independent from
each other. The advantages of this type ofdata structure are that vendors utilize different
data formatting and exchange architectures, allowing communication from vendor to
vendor without creating special purpose software to communicate. Common standards
promote the benefits from a vendor's perspective, that implementation of their software
will be widely accepted, and from the consumer's perspective, that theywill not be
forced to utilize one vendor's software. As business expands, the need formultiple
vendor software programs to communicate is forcing these architectures to be
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interconnected. Examples ofvendor architectures include Digital Network Architecture
(DEC), AdvanceNet (Hewlett Packard), Distributed Systems Architecture (Honeywell),
Internet Packet Exchange (Novell Netware), and Xerox Network Systems (XNS).
Today's standardized network architectures, or protocols, such as TCP/LP, OSI or SNA
Systems NetworkArchitecture, to name a few, were developed to permit allow
manufacturers to attach communications devices of all makes and models to the network
without having to redesign the network each time. These models in their early stages,
however, did not provide for reliable communications. There were no acknowledgments
as data packets traveled from point to point; nor were there acknowledgements from end
to end transmissions. There was no error control feature for data, only a header
checksum. If the ICMP detected an error, it would be recorded, but there were no re
transmissions. It became clear early on that IPv4 was not architected with security as a
priority. It was only after its vulnerabilities were exposed that modifications became
needed to protect the end user. In September, 1981, RFC 791 10 was published and
became what is now known as IPv4. This specification replaced RFC 760, which
describes the Internet's basic operations as follows:
1 . The Internet protocol implements two basic functions: addressing and
fragmentation. The Internet modules use the addresses carried in the Internet
header to transmit Internet datagrams toward their destinations. The selection of a
path for transmission is called routing. The Internetmodules use fields in the
Internet header to fragment and reassemble Internet datagrams when necessary for
transmission through "small packet" networks.
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2. The model of operation is that an Internet module resides in each host engaged in
Internet communication and in each gateway that interconnects networks. These
modules share common rules for interpreting address fields and for fragmenting
and assembling Internet datagrams. In addition, these modules (especially in
gateways) have procedures for making routing decisions and for other functions.
3. The Internet protocol treats each Internet datagram as an independent entity
unrelated to any other Internet datagram. There are no connections or logical
circuits (virtual or otherwise).
4. The Internet Protocol uses four keymechanisms in providing its service: Type of
Service, Time to Live, Options, and Header Checksum (these mechanisms are
described later).
With Internet specifications becoming standardized, virtually all computer vendors today
support TCP/LP as the Internet based protocol to be used. OSI and SNA are other
examples of important architecture supporting communications functions, but are not as
predominant today as they once were. All protocol models have a corresponding function
within its layering structure similar to the other models. For example, TCP operates at the
OSI layer 4, and LP operates at the OSI layer 3. These common protocols allow tasks
from one protocol to communicate with another protocol seamlessly to the end user.
From these basic models, other protocols have evolved that supply other functionality
such as SMTP, used for electronic mail, FTP, to transfer files, and SNMP, for network
management activities. Figure 5 illustrates a high-level comparison between architecture
protocols showing each protocol's corresponding layer to the other.
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Figure 5 - Comparison Between Architecture Protocols
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OSI Model
The OSImodel was developed by the ISO as amodel for protocol architecture standards
and for other protocols to use as a guide for development. It is made up of seven layers
that provide different functionality at each layer. The basic intent of the OSI model was
for other developing protocols to develop their functionality using the layered concept,
with the hope that proprietary implementations of specific protocols would eventually be
replaced. As many functional protocols have been developed and have consistently used
the OSI architectural model, the concept did not meet its anticipated growth and was
instead replaced by TCP/LP. There are a number of reasons for this, including the
complexity of the seven-layer approach, but the most predominant reason was, most
likely, timing. The TCP/LP architecture was tested at a stable point when business needed
an architecture that would address the need ofoperating across multiple networks. OSI
was still in its development stages. Even so, the OSI model did have merit and was used
extensively.
The OSImodel, as mentioned, is a seven-layered communications protocol,
internetworked together to common communication devices. The development of ideas
behind the OSI model followed a few basic concepts:
Each layer performs its own function.
Layers should be developed with the intent of future protocol standardization.
Boundaries are clearly identified between layers.
Develop enough layers so that specific data transfer functions can be distinct, and
placed properly in a layer.
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The OSI layers are:
Application - enables access to the OSI architecture structure and provides
informational services functionality. Other functions of this layer include file
transfer that can handle services such as electronic mail and directory look-ups.
Presentation - deals with the syntax of the data transmission by performing
repeatable tasks. An example might be a specified, agreed upon encoding service
among computers on different networks. The presentation layer verifies and
corrects the incoming and outgoing data.
Session - provides a structure between systems that allow connections and
terminations.
Transport - enables reliable data transport bymonitoring data flow and providing
error recovery bymaking sure the data arrives correctly. Data may be divided
among networks to improve transport efficiency.
Network - responsible for controlling the operation of the subnet by establishing,
maintaining, and terminating connections
Data Link - sends data frames of information across the network. This layer also
checks for transmission errors by creating and recognizing data frame
boundaries. The data link layer will solve issues that occur ifdata is lost,
damaged, or duplicated.
Physical - responsible for the basic transmission ofdata over the network
medium.
Figure 6 depicts how data transfer occurs in the OSI model by each defined service
providing a service to the layer above it. This hierarchical approach allows each layer to
be developed and continue to evolve independently of the other layers.
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Figure 6 - OSI Data Transmission
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TCP/IP
TCP packages and prepares data for transfer. LP is responsible for establishing the
framework needed for getting the data transferred successfully across the network. It
allows the exchange of information between different types ofnetworks that attach to an
LP gateway. Together, TCP/LP is a protocol suite that organizes software communications
to share resources across networks. It is the Internet based standard and the framework
for many other communication protocols. Within this protocol, data is passed through
multiple layers of the protocol architecture that are identified to a device, operating
system, or specific task. This process has been standardized by the LAB. Within the LAB
are committees that issue RFC's and STD's. The advantages ofhaving a common
protocol are to allow computers with different operating systems to communicate. This
advantage also has a downside by providing potential openings for security intrusions to
take place. These layers of the protocol have different functions in data handling. The
current model of the TCP/LP protocol suite can be grouped into five separate layers.
These layers provide different tasks that allow the transfer ofdata from one host to
another. These layers can be broken down as follows:
Application Layer - physical interface between a device such as a computer and
the network. This layer defines the transmission medium, type of signals used,
rate at which data is transferred, and any other characteristics associated with
moving the information through the network.
Transport Layer - focuses on the data exchange between peripherals and the
connected network.
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Internet Layer - these are the procedures or routing functions that allow data to
be transmitted across multiple networks.
Network Access Layer - deals with the exchange ofdata (accessing and routing)
between computers and the network to which they are attached.
Physical Layer - deals with the physical interfaces between data senders and
receivers such as computers and the transmission medium. The concerns of this
layer surround medium characteristics, signal characteristics, data transfer rates,
and anything else thatmay impact the transmission.
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Internet Protocol
LP is a connectionless service that permits network traffic between hosts, using a 32-bit
address scheme to identify the host computer and associated network. LP does not have
the capability to identify and reply to data transmission errors. Its design was meant to be
transparent to or independent of the network. If, for example, a datagram transmission
passes through a router and violates an established aspect such as size, the buffers will
overflow and remove the remaining datagrams. Unless a higher-level protocol such as
TCP recovers this type of information, datagrams can be lost, duplicated, or arrive in no
specific order. The design of LP allows for easy installation and provides a robust
protocol, but as indicated, no error recovery or data flow analysis. These responsibilities
reside at the TCP layer.
When a computer is hooked up to the Internet through an ISP, an address is assigned that
identifies that particular computer to the world. All devices that are connected to a
network require an LP address that conforms to the Internet Protocol naming convention
(Figure 7).
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This naming convention was devised to allow administrators the ability to control
networks within their LANs. The current addressing scheme within the IPv4 protocol
uses an address with 32-bits. When traffic is initiated through the network by a device
such as a computer, it passes through the transport layer, typically TPC or UDP. The
address is broken into two parts, one that identifies the subnetwork and the other that
identifies the node on the subnet. The data traffic is identified by a protocol LD. After the
receiving device has acknowledged it is ready to receive the data traffic, it is passed to
the network layer, which takes care of the network addresses, or LP addresses. LP
addresses are used to determine where the traffic is to be routed in the Internet and are
identified by formats known as Classes. There are four Classes: A, B, C, and D (Figure
8). The first portions, or bits, of the address indicate network identification addresses and
the remainder of the class indicates the number ofhosts that can be identified in the
network. Each class signifies a different network addressing schemes that would be
available if that specific architecture were selected.
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Class A
Network (7 bits) Host Address (24 bits)
Maximum number ofnetwork numbers is 126
Maximum number ofhost numbers is 16, 777,124
Nomenclature - network.host.host.host
Class B
10 Network (14 bits) Host Address (16 bits)
Maximum number ofnetwork numbers is 16,384
Maximum number ofhost numbers is 65,534
Nomenclature - network.network.host.host
Class C
110 Network (21 bits) Host Address (8 bits)
Maximum number ofnetwork numbers is 2,097,152
Maximum number ofhost numbers is 254
Nomenclature - network.network.network.host
Class D
Figure 8 - LP Address Formats
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Depending upon network requirements, other variations of these classes can be chosen.
These are specifically geared towards Internet usage. If a network is not going to be
accessing the Internet, then choosing a class will depend upon considerations such as
ratio ofnetworks to host machines and future growth ofboth, networks and host
machines.
The data sent by the host computer that is routed through a network is known as an LP
datagram or PDU. These data units can be divided, or fragmented into smaller, more
manageable units by a fragmentation process that is supported in the LP protocol. This is
needed because node devices would be required to solve incompatible PDU sizes
between devices otherwise. Figure 9 shows how an LP datagram, or PDU, can be broken
down into fields that describe how information is processedwhen using the LP protocol.
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LP Version Header Length
Type ofService
Total Length
Identifier
Flags Fragment Offset
Time to Live
Protocol
Header Checksum
Source Address
Destination Address
Options and Padding
Data
Figure 9 - IPv4 Datagram
IPv4 Datagram field descriptions:
LP Version - identifies the version ofLP in use. This is contained inmost
protocols with the current version at 4 or commonly referred to as IPv4. The next
generation is identified as 6, or IPv6.
Header Length - this field contains 4 bits that indicate the length of the datagram
header.
TOS -identify quality-of-service functions (data transit delays, data throughput,
data precedence, and data reliability) that are provided for the Internet. Currently
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some vendors do not use the TOS field in their implementations ofLP, but
increased capabilities of the Internet may promote increased usage.
Total Length - this is the total length of the datagrammeasured in octets and
includes the length of the header and associated data (determined by subtracting
the header length from the total length of the field).
Identifier- controls datagram fragmentation and repair along with Flags and
Fragment Offset. This field identifies fragments in a datagram.
Flags - this field determines whether the datagram can be fragmented.
Fragment Offset - contains a value that specifies a position of a fragment within
the original datagram.
Time-to-Live - measures amount of time a datagram is in the network by adding a
value to the parameter whenever a datagram passes through an LP node such as a
router.
Protocol - identifies the next layer protocol that will receive the datagram.
Header Checksum - detects any errors thatmay have occurred in the header, but
will still require a higher-level protocol to perform error checks on user data if
required.
Source Address - contains the Internet source address in the datagram.
DestinationAddress - contains the Internet destination address in the datagram.
Options - not used in all datagrams, but can be used for specific applications such
as network management and diagnostics.
Padding - ensures that the datagram header is aligned correctly.
Data - contains user data.
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LP datagrams identify how network information is broken down and evaluated at its
lowest level, but also has specific services that it can perform for different vendor
products. Depending upon the network architecture, some LP services will not be utilized.
When information is received at a router, LP verifies the header to determine the type of
network traffic it will be processing. If, for example, the information is a datagram, the
router will pass the information onto the header check, which will check for header
length, LP version numbers, message length, valid header checksum, and time in the
network (making sure this value is not at zero). If the information is accepted, it will be
passed to the next LP device; if the information is not accepted, it will be discarded.
LP also has different ways it can route information such as:
Source routing, which allows the upper-layer protocol to determine how the
routers will direct the datagrams. Looking at the addresses in the source routing
field to determine the next LP destination accomplishes this. If the required
datagram fields indicate that the routing list has been completed, then the
destination LP address is used. If the routing list has not been completed, then the
pointer increments LP addresses by one to the next address in the route.
Route recording is another example where LP uses the next address in the data
field to determine the next step the datagram will take. The difference here is that
the receiving LP device will add its LP address to the route. This happens after the
receiving LP device checks field lengths to determine if the recording list is full. If
the module is full, it will forward the datagram without inserting an address to the
next octet opening, where the address is inserted and the datagram is moved
forward to the next LP device.
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Time stamping the datagram as it passes through LP devices is another service of
LP. This allows for tracking the data route as it passes through the network and
shows the amount of time it takes to process data between each LP device. The
advantages of time stamping allow networks to be analyzed for efficiency.
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Internet Protocol Version 6
The Internet has grown so rapidly that it has forced change in the way the original IPv4
protocol was designed. From a historical perspective, Arpanet was designed as a packet
switching network that contained four nodes. It was designed at a reduced scale because
the original concept was for its use in research, design and educational arenas. As
visibility of the Internet gainedmomentum, organizations other than government and
education took notice. The LETF began looking at proposals that would define the size of
the address space required for the configuration. With the understanding that the Earth's
population would grow substantially, and the belief that anyone who wants to access the
Internet should be able to do so, technological progress became imminent. After taking
into account that users will, most likely, be accessingmultiple computers (not only the
ones on our desktops, but those that are incorporated into our everyday lives), it became
evident that a new version of the Internet Protocol would be needed to comprehend the
added demand.
Essentially, the major difference between IPv4 and IPv6
n falls into the following areas:
1. Expanded Addressing Capabilities: IPv6 increases the LP address size from 32
bits to 128 bits, to support more levels of addressing hierarchy, amuch greater
number of addressable nodes, and simpler auto-configuration of addresses. The
scalability ofmulticast routing is improved by adding a "scope" field to multicast
addresses. And a new type of address called an "anycast address" is defined, used
to send a packet to any one of a group ofnodes.
51
2. Header Format Simplification: Some IPv4 header fields have been dropped or
made optional, to reduce the common-case processing cost ofpacket handling and
to limit the bandwidth cost of the IPv6 header.
3. Improved Support for Extensions and Options: Changes in the way LP header
options are encoded allows formore efficient forwarding, less stringent limits on
the length of options, and greater flexibility for introducing new options in the
future.
4. Flow Labeling Capability: A new capability is added to enable the labeling of
packets belonging to particular traffic "flows" for which the sender requests
special handling, such as non-default quality of service or "real-time" service.
5. Authentication and Privacy Capabilities: Extensions to support authentication,
data integrity, and (optional) data confidentiality are specified for IPv6.
Initial concepts of the design began in 1991, and by 1995 four RFC's (Figure 10) were
introduced. These RFC's (1883-1886)
12
were to become the new version of the Internet,
classified as IPv6, and will incorporate new features that comprehend increased usage
and eliminate specific problems that have evolved in IPv4. Ipv6 will address specific
issues such as address space, inefficient operations, and network architecture techniques
that incorporate greater functionality and improved security. Many of the characteristics
of the IPv4 protocol will be retained for the time being, because of their dependencies on
other related protocols that have been developed extensively to support existing
transmissions such as video, data, and voice. Considering that IPv4 uses 32-bit address
spaces, the new configuration would allow for significant expansion to support the
increased demand without the concern of running out of address spaces. From a
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numerical value, there are many possible addresses that could be used, but partitioning of
this address space into similar IPv4 classes (A, B, C, D) has increased space limitations,
especially in the class C space which has the highest number ofnetworks associated with
it. Its possible to increase subnettingmore classes into class C, but that was not a viable
option for the LETF board because class networks have fixed boundaries between
identification ofnetwork and nodes. When a network number is assigned, all the host
addresses for that network are assigned to that network. For example, if a network needed
500 addresses, it would not be able to use class C addresses because it contains only 256
addresses. It would have to be assigned to class B which contains 65,536 addresses.
Seeing that the network would only be using 500 addresses, the remaining 65,036
addresses would become invalid or wasted. The inefficient use of this IPv4 addressing
scheme, coupled with the rapid increase in demand for LP addresses has led experts to
anticipate running out of addresses in the next ten to fifteen years.
From a security standpoint, the importance of incorporating securitymechanisms within
TCP/LP applications became paramount in the 1990's as intrusions became more
commonplace. Althoughmany of the TCP/LP's applications have securitymechanisms
built into them, it is farmore effective to have these mechanisms integrated at the lowest
possible protocol layer. IPv4 was not designed with security inmind and, as a result,
authentication and data verification were basically absent. IPv6 has deviated from the
IPv4 architecture and integrated two security schemes, LP Authentication Header and LP
Encapsulating Security Payload into its protocol.
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RFC 1883 This RFC specifies the basic IPv6 header and the initially defined IPv6
extension headers and options. It also discusses packet size issues, the
semantics of flow labels and priority, and the effects of IPv6 on upper-
layer protocols.
RFC 1884 This RFC defines the addressing architecture of the LP Version 6 protocol
[LPV6]. The document includes the LPv6 addressing model, text
representations of IPv6 addresses, definition of IPv6 unicast addresses,
anycast addresses, and multicast addresses, and an IPv6 nodes required
addresses.
RFC 1885 This document specifies a set of ICMP messages for use with version 6 of
the Internet Protocol. The IGMP messages specified in STD 5, RFC 1112
have beenmerged into ICMP, for IPv6, and are included in this document.
RFC 1886 This document defines the changes that need to be made to the Domain
Name System to support hosts running IPv6. The changes include a new
resource record type to store an IPv6 address, a new domain to support
lookups based on an IPv6 address, and updated definitions of existing
query types that return Internet addresses as part of additional section
processing. The extensions are designed to be compatible with existing
applications and, in particular, DNS implementations themselves.
Figure 10 - RFC's 1883 -RFC's 1886
The LP AR is an extension header that provides authentication and integrity for data
packet transfer. They compute a cryptographic authentication function over the IPv6
datagram utilizing an authentication key for encryption. Many other types of
54
authentication applications can be supported, but the use of the keyed MD5
13
algorithm
is needed to ensure proper operation. By using this algorithm, many network attacks such
as spoofing can be eliminated. Because LP is located on the Internet layer, it can provide
host authentication, which was a shortcoming with IPv4. IPv4 was only able to include
the sending host's address as indicated by the sending host's datagram. The IPv6
extension headers are inserted between the Internet header and payload fields and used to
identify the next header for the datagram (Figure 1 1 and Figure 12).
Next Header
TCP Header
Data
Figure 1 1 - Indicates No Header Extensions
New Header Extension
Next Header - Routing
Routing Header, thenNext Header
TCP Header
Data
Figure 12 - Indicates One Header Extension
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The header will be identified by its header type, which also contains the header type of
the next header in succession. The IPv6 protocol identifies six extension headers:
Fragment - IPv6 is similar to IPv4, but will not allow fragmentation ofPDU as
IPv4 did unless they were fragmented before entering the network. This will
reduce the processing time required to route the datagram to the next device in the
network.
Hop-by-hop Options Header - used for in-process operations such as error
detection and networkmanagement activities at intermediate devices, or nodes
(also known as hops), during data transfer. A similar service is used in IPv4
(payload) that allow large PDU's whose lengths exceed the 16-bit length field to
be sent. But, in IPv6, a processing node uses a field in the hop-by-hop options
header to determine how to process the PDU before sending it onto the next
device.
Authentication - sending and receiving parties both agree on an encryption
algorithm before data transfer takes place.
Routing - similar to the IPv4 routing header, which carries an LP address list,
which the datagram is routed to. The difference in IPv6 is the device node can
identify a routing header by looking at the destination field of the header. If it is
identified as a header extension address from a different source, it may be
ignored, thereby reducing processing time to route the information.
Encrypted Security Payload - data field authentication depending upon specific
encryption and authentication algorithms used.
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Destination Options Header - provides for transparent relay of information
through a network, but also contains an options field that has the ability to
generate a report indicating a problem has occurred.
Figure 13 summarizes address header fields between IPv4 protocol and IPv6 protocol.
IPv4 IPv6
Contains a Version Identifier - 4 Contains a Version Identifier - 6
Contains header length field Payload length replaces IPv4 total
length field
Contains TOS field Eliminated TOS field, but retains
some functionalitywhich is located
in priority and flow label fields
Contains identification, flag, and
fragment offset fields
Identification, flag, and fragment-
offset fields are eliminated, but
some functionality is retained and
placed in optional header extension.
Contains Protocol field Protocol function remains in
another extension header
Contains TTL field
TTL field renamed to Hop limit
field
Contains header checksum field Header checksum field eliminated
because most networks already
contain error checking at different
layers of the protocol
Contains Options field Options field is replaced with
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header extensions
Figure 13 - Comparison Table Depicting IPv4 and IPv6 Header Fields
With authentication information located at the Internet Layer in IPv6, increased
protection to higher layer protocols and applications will result in greater network
security, as authentication protection is now part of the protocol.
The other integrated IPv6 securitymechanism is LP Encapsulating Security Payload ESP.
This mechanism is fully described in RFC 1 827, and is an extension header that provides
integrity, authentication, and confidentiality for LP data packets. As with the
authentication header, ESP is algorithm independent, but should be used to ensure proper
authentication effectiveness. ESP works in IPv6 by surrounding either the complete
datagram or the upper layer protocol data inside the ESP, and encrypting the contents so a
new IPv6 header is appended to the ESP. The receiver of the datagram then removes the
appended header, decrypts the datagram, and processes the data in its original form. This
mechanism can be used to encrypt an entire data packet or a portion of a higher layer
segment located on the transport layer. This ability to encrypt and decrypt datagrams in
IPv6 adds to the overall security while reducing the effort required to authenticate
network data on both ends of a communication transfer.
To ensure an adequate supply of addresses, IPv6 is based on a 128-bit address scheme. In
theory, this addressing scheme would be able to support 2A128 addresses. The new
addressing scheme can be broken down into four-bit integers, each represented by a
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hexadecimal digit. Theywill be clustered together as eight (4 hexadecimal digits)
separated by colons (Figure 14).
U8H4:JD88:DKLE:3JDE:E03W:DJ39:DMC9:DI39
128-bit Address Scheme
Figure 14 - Example of4 Hexadecimal Digits Separated by Colons
It is quite possible that early implementations will use zeros in place of some of the 128
bits. In this case, the address string can be shortened with a zero. If a complete 4 hex digit
cluster has a value of zero, then colons can replace it as shown in Figure 15.
U8H4::DKLE:3JDE::DJ39:DMC9:DI39
128-bit Address Scheme
Figure 15 - Example of a Complete 4 Hex Digit Cluster with a Value ofZero
Even though IPv4 address schemes utilize a dot form (12.345.6.7), IPv6 will still be able
to incorporate it into the new scheme by adding the colons where needed (:: 12.345.6.7).
IPv6 also incorporates a hierarchical scheme compared to the flat address scheme used in
IPv4. The format of the address contains a prefix with five hierarchical subfields listed in
the specified order as shown below:
Prefix - LP address
Registry LD - allocating Internet addresses
Provider LD - ISP
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Subnetwork LD - ISP assigned subscriber LD
Subnetwork LD - subscriber subnetwork
Interface LD - subnetwork host address
Other addresses such as OSI's Network Service Access Points andNovell's LPX are also
supported in the IPv6 framework because of their current widespread use in IPv4. In
these cases, a prefix can be used to support an organization's private addresses within its
WAN, but cannot be utilized on the Internet. IPv6 also continues to supportmulticasting
as did IPv4, but adds additional functionality that is able to contain the scope of the
multicast function to a local network.
As mentioned earlier, data sent by the host computer that is routed through a network is
known as an LP datagram. The IPv6 datagram has changed from its predecessor in IPv4.
Figure 16 shows the datagram broken down into fields that describe how information is
processed.
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Version (4 bits) Priority (4 bits) Flow Label (24 bits)
Payload Length (16 bits)
Next Header (8 bits)
Hop Limit (8 bits)
Source Address (128 bits)
Destination Address (128 bits)
Data Variable
Figure 16 - IPv6 Datagram
IPv6 Datagram field descriptions:
Version - identifies version of the protocol.
Priority - similar in characteristics to the precedence field in IPv4, this field
supports different types ofnetwork traffic such as voice, video, and data, and can
be coded to indicate 16 possible values.
Flow Label - new to IPv6 and designed to handle different types ofnetwork
traffic such as voice, video, and data.
Payload Length - identifies the length of the payload. Its length is 16 bits, but is
supported within the protocol for longer lengths by utilizing the next header field.
Next Header - replaces the option field in IPv4 and identifies the next header as
either TCP or UDP. This identification scheme simplifies the processing of a data
packet because the header is now a fixed length.
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Hop Limit - identifies the number ofhops the datagram has while transmitting in
the network.
Source Address - contains the Internet source address in the datagram.
Destination Address - contains the Internet destination address in the datagram.
Data Variable - contains user data.
62
Intrusions and Detections
Computer intrusions or attacks can occur in several different areas of a networked
system. Early intrusions were simplistic in nature, mainly associated with exploiting poor
password practices or gaining access to systems that were not originally designed for
security. Once these intruders gained access, theymanulipated vulnerabilities that were
well known, but went unrepaired. At this time sophisticated techniques were not needed
because systems were designed with default settings that made accessing systems
relatively easy. Taking security as a design consideration was not practical, nor did
system administrators have the tools or expertise to modify or monitor their systems for
intruder activity. As intruder knowledge became more sophisticated by an increased
understanding ofnetwork integration, system operations, and network protocols,
techniques to protect network system infrastructures also needed to become more
complex to ward off attacks to known system vulnerabilities. Intruders began migrating
to source code, looking for weaknesses in programs. Unfortunately, many programs were
written withoutmuch thought focused on security. These programs became easy targets
because of their easy accessibility on the Internet.
Before any action to introduce a security system into a network begins, an overview of
system requirements should be taken. Specific objectives need to be in place regarding
the amount of security needed that address disaster recovery plans should a breach occur.
This is generally known as a company security policy and is a documented plan for
organization wide computer and information security procedures. These plans are the
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framework for making decisions that pertain to all aspects of a network. They include
different aspects of a network:
From a high level, these plans contain descriptions of the technical networked
environment, legal aspects, if any, and any overall interpretations thatmaybe
required to operate the system.
Some form ofrisk analysis that defines potential threats and recovery plans if the
network should be compromised is recommended. Recovery plans generally
define the critical business assets and which areas, functions, and or services
would need to become operational in order of importance. There are trade-offs in
these situations, and these types ofpolicies require a risk/cost assessment analysis
to determine the amount of investment needed to meet the overall business
objective of that network. By identifying the risks and the potential consequences,
a better-controlled detection and prevention environment exists. This allows the
security strategies to be integrated into the overall policy andmakes monitoring
and tracking more efficient. Once understood, a plan, or a security system audit
takes place that defines a business mentality towards securitywithin that network.
Guidelines for system administrators to define and manage systems under their
control.
Guidelines for users as defined by the overall security plan.
Guidelines for dealing with legal aspects of an attack, from law enforcement with
the intent of tracking the intruder to system shutdown and its associated
ramifications.
These aspects of a plan are part of an overall framework that also requires management
commitment to support the plan from enforcement to ensuring awareness that all users
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are informed ofpolicy specifics, as well as supplying adequate provisions for training and
materials. These materials include systems that provide authentication tasking, system
audits for security accountability issues, encryption systems and effective data storage
facilities, and tools needed for hardware such as firewall and proxy servers. Other areas
that should be looked at are security procedures that are based on the security plan that
was drawn up for that network. These procedures might be implemented by system
administrators with the intent ofprotecting data as well as ensuring that end users
understand their roles in securitymaintenance. Recommended practices could entail
aspects such as:
1 . Accounts have valid passwords that are difficult to guess. Changing passwords
regularly has its obvious advantages, but can also become frustrating for end users
who need to keep changing them. This can lead to sloppy storage ofpasswords
because users have a tendency to forget them, so theywill post them in spots they
remember and, therefore, can be easily found. Another way to prevent this is by
using a one-time password system that initiates a password to make a connection
before system confidentiality can be broken. An example of this is remote dial-up
connections where a user is required to logon to a network before he/she can
access personal data and other network resources. They are required to
authenticate and identify themselves to the server by inputting a username and
password. Because it is important that passwords are not reused, one-time
password systems incorporate technology that synchronizes a code initiated by a
device carried by the user and a corresponding code that will be recognized by the
server. These devices work by displaying a random code, or numeric password,
that remains in effect for a limited time. These codes are not repeated, and are
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available for a short time span. Once this code is inputted as a password, the
server in order to grant network access will verify it. If the user fails to input the
correct code sequence, he/she will need to use the next random code that appears
on the remote identification device. The constant changing of these password
codes greatly reduces the chances of intruders accessing the network at entry
points that require an initial password.
2. Utilizing strong encryption tools to maintain the integrity of the system. Intruders
often try to gain access to networked systems by imposing themselves as trusted
parties. They do this by acting as a trusted partner using a denial of service attack
and attempt to connect to the target server as the original trusted party. To
circumvent these types of attacks, it is necessary to monitor all incoming and
outgoing network traffic. These devices are known as firewalls, which are a
combination ofhardware and software designed to monitor and analyze network
data streams and service requests made upon the server. They analyze each data
packet and eliminate the ones that do not meet the established security criteria. A
firewall may be as simple as a router that filters data streams and discards
unauthorized data packets that contain unrecognized sender addresses or attempt
connection to unauthorized service ports. As firewalls become more sophisticated,
they begin to incorporate proxy servers that authenticate requests, verify content
integrity, and forward the data packets to the appropriate hosts. If a network is
going to maintain a high level of security confidence, it will need to be monitored
continuously. Additional tools to monitor the network can be placed at prescribed
locations for effective monitoring. These tools can be setup to scan, monitor, and
eliminate viruses that have been identified on the network. They are also used to
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notify system administrators by various methods such as email and pager when a
monitor detects unusual activity. Depending on the capabilities of the system, it is
feasible to expect these tools to have the capabilities ofnot only isolating and
detecting unwanted activity, but be able to counter it by blocking or disconnecting
connections, limiting or removing services, and providing data analysis of the
activity.
3. Developers incorporating security techniques whenwriting software code. This
may require commitment from management as part of their security plan because
it will usually entail longer timeframes to code the software, impacting schedules.
4. System administrators need to be kept abreast ofvulnerabilities and incorporate
the required changes in the system as soon as possible.
5. System Administrators need to keep up to date with the latest patches and fixes
that become available from software vendors such as Microsoft.
6. Monitor any security instances thatmay impact networks by on-line security
forums, which can show specific intrusion techniques and what preventative
measures, can be taken to avoid them. A good example is the MelissaVirus,
whichwas first, found in 1999 and executed a macro in aWord document that
was attached to an incoming email. When the email attachment was opened, the
macro forwarded the Word document to fifty additional users in the user's
Outlook address book. This continued as each user opened the attachment and
spread very quickly to thousands of computers. WhenMicrosoft realized the virus
was a problem, they posted, on their web site, the latest patches that would fix the
problem. In this instance the system administrator would have needed to access
the on-line site for instructions to install and implement the software. The site
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would also explain any preventative measures that could be taken to prevent
future outbreaks.
7. Checking for regular system audits to check system logs for any anomalies that
can detect and trace intrusions.
Once overall procedures are in place or understood, two other aspects ofa security
system should be looked at when determining the objectives of a network, physical and
logical. The physical aspect pertains to access to the system resources such as network
and data equipment, including internal and external hard drives, CD's, and backup
equipment. The logical looks at security that can be accessed through the Internet.
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These areas can include:
Monitoring of system resources and having access to root directories, files access,
and registries.
Network connections access.
Defined securitymanagement of the users, groups, andmonitoring ofresources
on the network. This includes permissions and user rights to specific directories.
Accounts and administrative policies, which include licenses, expirations,
auditing, and intruder detection.
Authentication strategies of local and remote secure cards.
Security strategies such as Certificate Authorities, encryption techniques, and
digital signatures.
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From a network security perspective, most intrusions occur fromwithin corporate
firewalls. Effectively deploying security functionalitymeans systems need to be
specifically designed and broadly employed to meet current and future breaches.
Historical background information can help define some of the security perspectives we have
today. The concepts ofprotocols are developed from a progression of changes in networking
systems. Microsoft for instance, has identified a progression of changes since the early 1980's
that have impacted their design philosophies of current Information Technology systems.
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Some of the most prominent are:
User-related data requiring a growing share of the computer's registry.
Greater differentiation of "namedobjects"requiring greater organization.
Additional services are utilizing their own process space in the operating system.
Servers are becoming specialized, catering to specific applications.
Functionalmanagement areas are becoming very application specific.
Distributed systems are utilizing greater security systems in their networks.
Distribution of security information improves performance and fault tolerance.
These trends show the transition from personal computers to workgroup models to
domains as a step from stand-alone systems to distributed networking systems.
Fundamental changes from workgroup methodologies to hierarchical methodologies
helped form the structure seen with current scalable system architecture design. This is
also evident in protocol design methodologies as seen in the TCP/LP, OSI, and SNA
protocols. These hierarchical methodologies can also be cross-referenced against other
protocols to identify functional area boundaries within security systems. The advantage
of identifying functional areas within a protocol is that it allows for greater
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troubleshooting capabilities when a security incident takes place. The ability to narrow
components that may be a part of the intrusion can be advantageous in quickly getting the
system cleaned and operational again.
Identifying the types of attacks on a network system can be a daunting task considering
the sheer volume of attacks that occur and the many avenues from which they can occur.
With intruders having access to networks via the Internet, infrastructure components such
as routers, gateways, firewalls, etc., have provided avenues where illicit behavior can be
hidden. A Trojan horse attack, for example, might be hidden by the fact that network
authentication might be altered from system administrators, allowing access to a system
without raising a red flag that indicates unauthorized use. Another example is Internet
protocols such as the NFS, which allow systems to share files, but do not have the ability
for user authentication. Software designers, especiallywith designs surrounding IPv4,
often did not include security in the initial stages and found themselves adding these
requirements after initial designs were completed and implemented. Consequently, these
additional components of the design had holes in them, which were exploited.
Although design considerations are vital to the security of a networked system,
vulnerabilities can exist from poor implementation procedures. This also can include
flaws in the software that were not identified before its release. These types of
vulnerabilities have a wide range of classes and subclasses that can be exploited by
attackers utilizing their own tools. Examples of these types ofclasses are:
Misuse of system calls.
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Reusing systemmodules for purposes other than their intended use.
Ineffective checks of the operating system.
Ineffective and incomplete checking of success or failure conditions.
Inability to verifywhen resources are depleted.
These are examples ofvulnerabilities caused by the particular way the protocol
components have been setup. If, for example, a network protocol was setup with
inadequate logon values or defaults, and system administrators fail to change them, this
could potentially allow intruders to access the network. For instance, an FTP service
generally requires their password files and associated logon files to be separate from the
rest of the operating system. If the anonymous FTP logon defaults were configured
improperly, unauthorized users might be able gain access to authentication information
and use it to compromise the system.
Tools used by intruders also have led to attacks becoming more effective and devastating.
As much as some of these tools help system administrators identify issues and monitor
their network traffic, they can also facilitate attackers. Many of these tools have become
automated, allowing attackers to gain information about Internet network hosts with
minimum effort by scanning entire networks from remote locations. Other tools can
attack components in phases that combined, contribute to a specified outcome. An
example might be an intruder gaining access to a packet sniffer that has router or firewall
passwords, eventually allowing the intruder the ability to access data on servers within
that network. According to the CERT, 16 there are many automated software packages
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that contain tools to exploit network vulnerabilities. Typically, a software package may
include:
Network scanners
Password cracking tools with dictionaries
Packet sniffers
Trojan horse programs and their associated libraries
Tools to modify system log files
Tools to allow the attacker to remain anonymous
Tools to modify system configuration files
Tools to report false checksums
By breaking down security intrusions into categories, it becomes easier to define an
attack. The following list describes the basic types of intrusions or attacks that take place
over the Internet:
1 . Probes - Probes can be looked at as attempts that are not normal to gain access to
a specific system or an attempt to discover information about a specific system.
An example might be as simple as an attempt to log onto a system account. Often
these kinds of intrusions are the result of amistake, but they can lead to amore
serious security breach.
2. Scan - Using automated software tools, scan periodically or continuously probes
or pings a specified system. Like probes, scans can at times be the result ofan
error, but can also lead to more serious security breaches.
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3. Malicious Code - A basic term for software programs that can cause results on a
system not intended by the original network design. These kinds of codes include
Trojan horses, viruses, and worms. Trojan horses and viruses typically are hidden
in legitimate files or programs that have been modified. Worms are replicating
programs that can spread on their own after they have been initialized. Viruses are
also replicating programs, but usually require an action on some part of the user to
spread. An example is an email attachment that has no impact until opened. Then
it alters other programs as they are opened. Generally, end users are unaware of
these programs until some form ofdamage has taken place.
4. Denial ofService - The idea behind a denial of service attack to is prevent
specified users from accessing a specific service. These kinds of attacks are not
intended to gain access to specific machines or data. Examples might include an
attacker flooding a network with large amounts ofdata or specifically targeting a
resource that impacts another service, either by slowing it down or bringing it to a
complete halt.
5. Account Compromise - Involves unauthorized use ofa users account by someone
not intended to have rights. This refers to an attacker that can compromise an
account without having system or root level access privileges. The damage of this
kind of attack can generally be minimized because the intruded does not have root
access, but can still cause damage at the user level accounts. There can still be
considerable loss ofdata or impact to services.
6. Packet Sniffer - This is a program that captures data from the information packets
as they travel over the network. The data able to be captured can include
usernames, passwords, and proprietary information. Packet sniffers can
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sometimes be installed without having system privileges, and can capture
sensitive data that can eventually lead to additional attacks on systems.
7. Root Compromise - This kind of compromise is similar to an Account
Compromise, but the account compromised on the system has special privileges
that may allow access to other system wide programs. If an attacker has root
privileges, they can do anything they want, including changing or removing
programs, changing system parameters, or injecting trace programs that can be
used at a later time.
8. Exploitation ofTrust - With security becoming a paramount issue, many systems
are developing trust relationships. Trusts are essentially a check from one
computer to another that each is who they claim to be. This is done before an
exchange of files takes place. If an intruder can access a computer and appear to
act as one of the trusted computers, he/she or itmay be able to gain entry to other
systems.
9. Internet Infrastructure Attacks - These are attacks that involve key aspects of the
Internet such as network access providers instead of specific systems on a
network. These attacks are usuallywidespread and impact the infrastructure,
hampering daily activities of impacted sites.
Phillip G. Schein identifies six information security controls (name, access, availability,
integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation) and categorizes them into
three attack modalities (each contains an active and a passive state) that describe Internet
attacks.
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1 . Interference - any form of security attack that renders a device or service inoperative.
a. An active interference attack targets a device or service with the intent to disable or
destroy. An examplemight be boot sector viruses that rewrite the master boot record
on a hard drive or DOS attacks that overwhelm a service provider, rendering it
inoperative.
b. A passive interference attack, such as a virus or a bacterium, does not necessarily
target the device or service directly, but tries to disable them through indirect
activities. An example might be a virus that diverts all resources to a specific task,
thereby denying needed resources to a required task.
2. Interception - an attack that captures a data stream bymonitoring or redirecting it.
a. An active interception intercepts datamessage flow and interprets the message
content. When the content is verified, the attack can alter the content, and
redirect it to another location, causing a change in actions or service for that
particular application.
b. A passive interception intercepts a data flow and analyzes the data content,
but does not alter its content. Examples may include network traces.
3. Impersonation - any attack that allows a third party intruder to access a network,
acting as one of the parties, to exchange data without the knowledge of the last party.
a. An active impersonation can be spoofing or identifying an incorrect LP
address of one of the parties without the other being aware of it.
b. A Passive impersonation does not impact the data stream directly, but tries to
work indirectly to create some unauthorized effect. An example might be
renaming a DNS name causing the legitimate DNS lookup to respond to
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illegitimate host names. This can also involve the creation of another access
point that allows unauthorized access to system resources by the third party.
Many attacks will take a mixed form, with characteristics from each modality.
Classifying these risks will help in identifying and resolving, or at leastminimizing them.
Figure 1 7 shows examples of security intrusions within eachmodality.
Active Passive
Interference Denial of Service Active Viruses, Bacteria
Interception Web Page Redirection Wire Taps
Impersonation Spoofs (attacker that impersonates
a legitimate user), Rogue Users
(authenticated user that can
access an unauthorized system),
Cracker (unauthorized user that
has complete access to security
systems.
Trap Doors, Trojan Horse
Figure 17 - Examples ofSecurity Intrusions Within EachModality
By identifying risks and categorizing them, it becomes more manageable to determine
not only the source of the intrusion, but also where in the protocol the intrusion is taking
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place. Essentially, intrusions occur at different layers of the TCP/LP or OSI protocol, so
security protocols that ward off these attacks must also be a part of that layer. An
example of this is shown in Figure 18.
OSI Layers SNA Layers TCP/IP Layers Related Security Protocols
Application
Laver
Transaction
Services Layer
Application
Layer
S/MLME, Kerberos
Protocol, Proxy Services,
Secure Electronic
Transactions, LPSec,
Internet Key Exchange
Protocol
Presentation
Layer
Presentation
Layer
Session Layer
Data Flow
Layer
Transport
Layer
Transmission
Control Layer
Transport
Layer
SOCKS, Secure Sockets
Layer, Transport Layer
Security
Internet LPSec, Authentication
Header, Encapsulated
Security Payload, Packet
Filtering, Point-to-Point
Tunneling Protocol,
Handshake Authentication
Protocol, Password
Authentication Protocol
Network Layer
Data Path
Layer
Network Layer
Data Link Data Link
Layer
Physical Layer Physical Layer
Physical Layer
PPP
Figure 1 8 - Security Protocols and Their Corresponding Layer Listing to Other Protocols
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In 2001 the SANS Institute, alongwith the NLPC released a document that summarized
the tenmost critical Internet Security vulnerabilities (Figure 19).
19 This list was used by
thousands of organizations showing the top ten vulnerabilities with windows and the next
ten showing vulnerabilities affecting UNIX systems. While this list is only the tip of the
iceberg reflecting only a small portion of security infractions, it does allow administrators
a viable resource for auditing their systems. It also indicates how a potential single
remedy such as a software upgrade (patch or newer version) in many cases can fix the
problem. The following table lists and describes the top vulnerabilities to bothWindows
and UNIX systems according to the SANS Institute.
Windows Systems
Internet Information Services Prone to vulnerabilities within three classes:
1 . Failure to handle improperly formed HTTP
requests. Depending upon the request, an attacker
can view the source code, view files outside the
root file, view other unauthorizedweb server files,
and execute commands on the server.
2. Buffer overflows, which can result in denial of
service and execution of commands in the web
server's user directory.
3. Sample applications, which are used to
demonstrate server functionality. An attack can
allow creation or rewriting server files, remote
viewing of specific files for information
gathering, and potential remote access to server
information.
MDAC - Remote Data Services Older versions ofMDAC have a program flaw
that allows remote users to run commands with
administrative privileges which may provide
external access to internal databases.
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Microsoft SQL Server Contain vulnerabilities that allow remote
attackers access to key information, ability to
change database / server configurations.
NETBIOS - Unprotected
Windows networking shares
Windows allows hostmachines to share files with
other hostmachines through network shares. Using
the SMB protocol, a host machine can control
remote files.
Anonymous Logon - Null
Sessions
Allows anonymous users to retrieve information
without authentication.
LAN Manager Authentication Legacy data stored locallywith weaker encryption
protection allows easier access.
GeneralWindows
Authentication
Most forms of authentication rely on user-supplied
passwords. Common vulnerabilities are accounts
with limited or no passwords, protection by the
users to protect it, presence ofpassword breaking
algorithms.
Internet Explorer LE has vulnerabilities including web page spoofing,
ActiveX control, MLME-typemisinterpretations and
buffer overflows.
Remote RegistryAccess Typical Windows systems use a hierarchical
database (registry) to manage components such as
software, device configurations and user settings.
Ineffective settings or permissions can allow access.
Windows Scripting Host Windows Scripting Host (WSH) allowed and file
with a .vbs extension to be executedwhen that file
was viewed by the user.
UNIX Systems
RPC's RPC's allow programs from one machine to
execute procedures on another. Used mainly
in distributed systems, RPC executes with
root privileges, and if compromised can
allow access to other systems at the root level
79
ApacheWeb Server
SSH Popular service for securing logins,
command executions, and file transfers, but
vulnerable to root access from a remote user.
SNMP Used extensively to monitor and configure
TCP/LP devices such as printers, routers,
switches, and provides input for monitoring
devices. The methodwhich this protocol
utilizes agent software (method which
messages are handled) along with an
authenticationmechanism, provide
vulnerabilities.
FTP Used to distribute files to anonymous users.
Generally does not require unique login and
passwords.
R-Services / Trust Relationships R-commands are extensively used and
generally groups configure systems so that
users do not need unique user LD's and
passwords. These types ofServices lack
encryption and have poor authentication.
LPD Service that allows connection of a local
printer to a local machine utilizing TCP port
515. May contain programming flaws to
allow access to root privileges.
Sendmail Program that sends, receives, and forwards
electronic mail processed on UNLX systems.
Risks can be caused by buffer overflows and
improper configurations.
BIND /DNS Allows location of a server by name without
using its LP address. Potential attacks occur
because ofoutdated configurations and bad
configuration files.
General UNLX Authentication Most forms ofauthentication rely on
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user-supplied passwords. Common
vulnerabilities are accounts with limited or
no passwords, protection by the users to
protect it, presence ofpassword breaking
algorithms.
Figure 19-2001 SANS Institute Document that Summarized the Ten
Most Critical Internet SecurityVulnerabilities
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Viruses
Computer viruses are programs that are designed to replicate and spread themselves.
They usually require a host of some kind that will allow them to propagate and can have
impact on all programs, files, and hard disks. Original theories 20 of self-replicating
programs date back to around 1950, with test viruses first programmed in the 1960's.
Figure 20 shows a generic timeline of some of the famous viruses.
Virus Date Description
Not Named 1950 Developed self-replicating programs
Not Named Mid-1980's Coined "Virus" phrase as a program that can
affect other computer programs by replicate
itself
Brain 1986 Boot sector virus that worked only on floppy
disks, not hard drives and tried to hide itself
from detection
Lehigh 1987 Gained control ofopening system files
Jerusalem 1987 First memory resident file infector that attacked
on specific dates
InternetWorm 1988 Crashed large numbers of computers
Cascade 1988 Was able to prevent system administrators from
changing or removing the virus
Dark Avenger 1989 It was designed to damage system slowly, going
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unnoticed until it was too later for recovery
Frodo 1989 Fully stealth virus that attacked only on specific
dates
Tequila 1991 One of the first viruses that had the capabilities
to change it's appearance after detection
Michelangelo 1990 More hype than anything else - crashed fewer
computers than was originally predicted
Pathogen 1994 Identified by Scotland Yard's crime unit
Concept 1994 Macro virus that worked in aMicrosoft Word
environment
Boza 1996 Infected Microsoft Excel spreadsheets
Laroux 1996 Infected Microsoft Excel spreadsheets
Melissa 1999 Executed a macro in a document that was
attached to n email. When the attachment was
opened, it was forwarded to fifty other users
in the infected users Microsoft Outlook address
book
Chernobyl 1999 Caused major damage bymaking the users
hard drive inaccessible
Love Bug 2000 Similar to Melissa by sending itself through
Microsoft Outlook. Also known as the Love
Letter
W97M.Resume.A 2000 New version ofMelissa
Stages 2000 Utilized .txt extensions to spread itself
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Liberty 2000 Assumed to be the first Trojan Horse virus
The Anna
Kournikova
2001 Similar to the Love Bug andMelissa viruses
Code I and Code II 2002 Worm spreads through internal and external
networks
Klezworm 2002 It creates a hidden copy of the original host
file, then overwrites the original file with itself
Nimda 2002 Infects both local and remote files by sending
out emails, searching for open ports and
attempts to copy itself
Figure 20 - Famous Virus Dates
The term "Virus" was coined because these programs were small, made copies of
themselves, and could not exist without a host (similar in nature to a biological virus).
Early incidents began appearing as the PC revolution began to take hold in the mid-to-
late 1980's. As these incidents began increasing in frequency, the number ofways of
spreading them grew as well. Viruses can propagate themselves in different ways. Email
attachments appear to be one of the most popular ways of infecting computers. The
viruses are resident in email attachments and propagate themselves when the attachments
are read. Othermeans of virus transmission is through theWorld WideWeb (because of
a lack of security surrounding data transmission), FTP (Internet protocol used to transmit
information), and News Groups, which have become a widespread avenue for
exchanging data among users.
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Currently there are five types of recognized viruses. 21
Macro Viruses - These types ofviruses infect data file and are the most
common. They impact typical tools in use today such as Microsoft Office
Suite that contains Word, PowerPoint, Excel, and Access. These viruses
utilize internal programs that were designed to automate tasks within the
program. Microsoft's Visual Basic code in the Microsoft Office application
allowed a virus to be written that would infect its data files as well as other
associated data files. This type ofprogramming allowed viruses to be created
relatively easily, sendingmany varieties into the computer mainstream. Some
examples of these types ofviruses include the Melissa, NiceDay, and Groov.
File Infector Viruses - These types ofviruses infect program executable code
such as .exe files. They have the ability to infect other programs when the
original infected program is run. These are memory resident viruses, which
infect non-infectedmemory after being run. Examples of these types of
viruses are Jerusalem and Cascade.
Multi-Partite Viruses - These viruses infect computer's boot record and
program files. A primary trait in these viruses is the difficulty in removing
them from boot sectors. If the virus is not completely removed, it will be
reinfected. This also holds true with infected files. If they are not removed
completely, they can reinfect the system the next time the files are opened.
Examples ofMulti-Partite viruses are One_Half, Emperor, Anthrax, and
Tequila.
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Boot Sector Viruses - When a computer system initiates, there is a small
program in the boot sector that runs. These types ofviruses become a part of
this program and activate themselves when the user attempts to startup the
computer. They are memory resident viruses and can impact all PC's floppy
or hard drive boot sectors. Because they are memory resident, they remain in
memory and will infect other files when run, unless they are write-protected.
Examples ofBoot Sector Viruses are Form, Disk Killer, Michelangelo, and
Stoned.
Master Boot Record Viruses - These viruses infect disks in the same manner
Boot Sector Viruses do, but infect the area of the disk where a good copy of
the boot record is stored. With certain operating systems such as Microsoft
NT, if either the Boot Sector orMaster Boot Record Sector is infected, the
system will not initialize. This is primarily due to the fact that the NT
operating system accesses the boot information from different locations than
other operating systems. NT is formatted with FAT partitions, and if infected
would allow boot-up from the DOS prompt. Examples ofMaster Boot Record
Viruses are NYB, AntiExe, and Unashamed.
From a broad perspective there may be five types ofviruses, but they can impactmany
different types of applications and programs. The following table (Figure 21) was
compiled by Symatnec/Norton Antivirus , and shows the prefix of the virus, and the
types ofapplications that can be affected.
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A2KM Access macro viruses are native to Access 2000.
A97M Access macro viruses are native to Access 97.
AM Access macro viruses are native to Access 95.
AOL Trojan horses that are specific to America Online
environments and usually steal AOL password information
BAT Batch file threats.
Backdoor Threats may allow unauthorized users to access your
computer across the Internet.
Bloodhound Bloodhound is the name of the NortonAntivirus heuristic
scanning technology for detecting new and unknown viruses
Ddos Distributed Denial of Service threats. Distributed Denial of
Service involves using zombie computers in an attempt to
flood an Internet site with traffic.
DoS Denial ofService threats. Not to be confused with DOS
viruses, which are named without prefixes.
HLLC High Level Language Companion viruses. These are usually
DOS viruses that create an additional file (the companion) to
spread.
HLLO High Level Language Overwriting viruses. These are usually
DOS viruses that overwrite host files with viral code.
HLLP High Level Language Parasitic viruses. These are usually
DOS viruses that attach themselves to host files.
HLLW A worm that is compiled using a High Level Language. This
modifier is not always a prefix, it is only a prefix in the case
of a DOS High Level LanguageWorm. If the Worm is a
Win32 file, the proper name would be W32.HLLW.
HTML Threats that target HTML files.
IRC Threats that target LRC applications.
JS Threats that are written using the JavaScript programming
language.
Java Viruses that are written using the Java programming
language.
Linux Threats that target the Linux operating system.
02KM Office 2000 macro viruses. May infect across different types
r* ^-* /*/* ^ s\ r\ j-v -i
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ofOffice 2000 documents.
097M Office 97 macro viruses. May infect across different types of
Office 97 documents.
OM Office macro viruses. May infect across different types of
Office documents.
PWSTEAL Trojan horses that steal passwords.
Palm Threats that are designed to run specifically on the Palm OS.
Trojan/Troj These files are not viruses, but Trojan horses. Trojan horses
are files that masquerade as helpful programs, but are actually
malicious code. Trojan horses do not replicate.
UNLX Threats that run under any UNIX-based operating system.
VBS Viruses that are written using the Visual Basic Script
programming language.
W2KM Word 2000 macro viruses. These are native to Word 2000 and
replicate underWord 2000 only.
W32 32-bit Windows viruses that can infect under all 32-bit
Windows platforms.
W95 Windows 95 viruses that infect files under the Windows 95
operating system. Windows 95 viruses often work in
Windows 98 also.
W97M Word 97 macro viruses. These are native toWord 97 and
replicate underWord 97 only.
W98 Windows 98 threats that infect files under the Windows 98
operating system. Will onlywork in Windows 98.
WM Word macro viruses that replicate underWord 6.0 andWord
95 (Word 7.0). Theymay also replicate underWord 97 (Word
8.0), but are not native toWord 97.
WNT 32-bitWindows viruses that can infect under the Windows
NT operating system.
Win Windows 3.x viruses that infect files under the Windows 3.x
operating system.
X2KM Excel macro viruses that are native to Excel 2000.
X97M Excel macro viruses that are native to Excel 97. These viruses
may replicate under Excel 5.0 and Excel 95 as well.
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XF
XM
Excel formula viruses are viruses using old Excel 4.0
embedded sheets within newer Excel documents.
Excel macro viruses that are native to Excel 5.0 and Excel 95.
These viruses may replicate in Excel 97 as well.
Figure 21 - Virus Prefix and Application Infected
89
Security Controls
Understanding security intrusions is part of an overall security protection strategy. As
security risks increase and become more complex in nature, the need to interject security
protection before an intrusion strikes becomes more critical. With protocol architectures
becoming hierarchical in nature, as TCP/LP is, the ability to impose effective security
measures at specific layers of the protocol is necessary to target specific intrusions. The
basic aspects of security are confidentiality and authentication. To introduce these
aspects, certain controls are needed to provide the confidentiality needed for secure data
transactions between a service provider and the consumer.
These controls are application program interfaces that interact with security providers and
security protocols such as Authentication Header Protocol and Encapsulated Security
Payload Protocol to support a networked system. One of these controls is the PKI, which
is a collection of tools, and technologies that provide a secure exchange ofdata from both
an internal and external network architecture environment. PKI works to verify
confidentiality and authenticity between information sharing networks. Security, or
cryptographic technologies generate a specific component that provides measures against
attacks. The basic components ofcryptographic technologies are symmetric key
encryption algorithms, asymmetric key encryption algorithms, and secure one-way hash
functionality.
Today, one of the most common ways to encrypt amessage is to use a single key that is
known only to the parties that are sharing the data transfer. This type of encryption
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requires the sender to use a key that scrambles a string of characters into an encrypted
message. The receiver then uses the same key to unscramble the encryptedmessage back
into the original form. This type of encryption is characterized as symmetric key
encryption. The guarantee that the information is secure resides in the confidentiality of
the key used (whichmay be public) and the length of the key. The encryption algorithm
must be as strong as possible to improve confidentiality. The simpler the algorithm code,
9'!
the easier it is to break it. Keys follow a standard that was developed byANSI in 1975.
This standard is the Data Encryption Standard DES 24 that originally used a fixed length
56-bit key for encryption algorithms. Since this is no longer considered strong enough, a
new key that uses three 128-bit keys has been implemented. Asymmetric key encryption
uses a set of complimentary key algorithms. One of the keys is confidential while the
other key is public. A standard known as RSA (for the last names of the inventors,
Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman) uses asymmetric keys that are functions of two large
numbers that can continually be increased to resist intrusions. These keys provide
considerablymore confidentiality and authenticity protection than symmetric key
encryption algorithms, but are many times slower to process because of their size. The
third cryptographic technique provides secure one-way hash functionality. Essentially the
hash function takes a variable lengthmessage and converts it into a fix length string (also
known as a hash value). A mathematical algorithm similar to the encryption algorithm
generates a 128 bit to 256-bit value that is derived from the original message. The value
is authenticated through comparison of the original message by generating a second hash
function and comparing it to the first. If there are character discrepancies between the
two, then the authenticity of the message needs to be questioned. If the two values agree,
then the message is authenticated indicating there were no modifications during transit.
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Using an encryption algorithm technique like this is relatively simple, yet the
disadvantages of all the parties that are engaged in this information exchange, knowing
the secret shared key, increases the likelihood that the keymay be compromised.
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Certificate Authority
Other forms of encryption and authentication (cryptography) technologies are being
developed as a way of disguising information, as data transfer over private and public
communications networks increases. For example, third party software companies such
as VeriSign offer digital certificates or CA's, which allow unknown users to trust each
other with all data transactions. These types of certificates are transmitted over networks
known as SSL protocol, and are maintained through servers. These parties have what is
known as a trust or trusted relationship with each other. This essentially indicates that the
information shared by each party is private and trustworthy. A digital signature (regarded
as an electronic signature) identifies that data transfer is original from the parties that
possess the key. There is a standard (International Telecommunications Union
Telecommunication Standard X.509) that companies such as Verisign Inc., use to
maintain digital certificate integrity. Certain certificate vendors will do complete
background searches of companies to verify that organizations are who they actually
claim to be. VeriSign, for example, documents its practices in a Certificate Practices
Statement, and undergoes an annual audit by KPMG for verification of its processes and
procedures.
Encryption techniques require the data sender and the data receiver to decipher a specific
digital identifier code, or key. Everyday examples ofdigital LD's (keys) are computer
passwords and bank PLN numbers. These keys are private because they are encrypted and
decrypted only by the sending and receiving parties. Public keys can be issued, for
example, in circumstances where multiple parties need to access a specific data server.
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These keys were originally published by the U.S. Government in 1977 and known as
Data Encryption Standards (DES) 26. The goal was to establish an industry standardized
encryption algorithm. The algorithm is plain text, and depending upon the number of
characters used, creates different degrees ofdifficulty to decode. For example, if the
degree of securitywarranted by a specific project requires low-level encryption, then a 40
-bit encryption code may be chosen. This would be a key ofplain text that contains
alphanumeric symbols placed in random order that only the trusted parties would be
aware of. Figure 22 shows an example of an encryption key.
BEGIN
abcjl8Nyba4finJHUMM8739imfd9v9234mdm9i9JOT
jilHNmb8yyu6G6RhbUH8HHI9u90kkkoI9uhRF6r6gyg7y8H8Y7tg77tg77g7u877G8u8U9883ndnjbnuuuH
BYgYgGYgfg877g8UbgYP67g8Tt9yh8Gtg87T6Gg87T8Yuh99y998HHH88Tgh8hgbT56f7t6Rg887h9j0u
U0j0jYTRyuGTd4wZYbom-jNOPj98y6DvFeDuhj0U09I-K-
0=j89yF6d7f67r68abcjl8Nyba4foiJHUMM8739imfd9v9234mdm9i9JJ^
NNimnINnI8NpOjjiIHNihb8yyu6G6MbUH8HHI9u901ddcoI9uhRF6r6gyg7y8H8Y7tg77tg77g7u877G8u
8U9883ndnjbnuuuHBYgYgGYgfg877g8UbgYF67g8Tt9yh8Gtg87T6Gg87T8Yuh99y998HHH88Tgh8hgb
T56m6Rg887h9j0uU0j0jYTRyuGTd4wZYbom-jNOPj98y6DvFeDuhj0U09I-K-^
j89yF6d7f67r68abcjl8Nyba4foiJHUMM8739imfd9v9234mdm9i9JJJBXddda7
imnINnI8NpOjjiIHNihb8yyu6G6RhbUH8HHI9u90kkkoI9uhRF6r6gyg7y8H8Y7tg77tg77g7u877G8u8U9
883ndnjbnuuuHBYgYgGYgfg877g8UbgYF67g8Tt9yh8Gtg87T6Gg87T8Yuh99y998HHH88Tgh8hgbT56f
7t6Rg887h9j0uU0j0jYTRyuGTd4wZYbom-jNOPj98y6DvFeDuhj0U09I-K-o
j89yF6d7f67r68abcjl8Nyba4fciJHUMM8739imfd9v9234mdm9i9JJJBXd
imiuT^iJ8NpOjjiIHNihb8yyu6G6RhbUH8HHI9u901ddcoI9uhilF6r6gyg7y8H8Y7tg77tg77g7u877G8u8U9
883ndnjbnuuuHBYgYgGYgfg877g8UbgYF67g8Tt9yh8Gtg87T6Gg87T8Yuh99y998HHH88Tgh8hgbT56f
7t6Rg887h9j0uU0j0jYTRyuGTd4wZYbom-jNOPj98y6DvFeDuhj0U09I
END
Figure 22 - Example of an Encryption Key
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Note: This example is not an actual industry key, but only a representation ofwhat an
encryption key would look like. All keys require a beginning and ending value. A 40-bit
key has over 70 quadrillion possible combinations that can be displayed and would be
required to break the code. If additional security is needed, the encryption key can be
increased to 128-bit.
Once a certificate is issued, only each party knows the key for the transaction to occur.
For this type of relationship to exist, three specific functions
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must be supported:
Mutual authentication where the identity of the server and the customer are
mutually recognizable.
Secure messaging is engaged between the server and the customer using the
assigned key.
The integrity of the message is protected from intrusion.
Figure 23, according to Verisign, illustrates how the client/server communicate when
requesting an encrypted communication session. These types ofdigital encryption
techniques help protect users who are concerned about Internet security. Although
considerablymore secure than not having any encryption protection, vulnerabilities still
exist in various forms such as:
Spoofing - creating illegitimate web sites that appear to replicate legitimate sites.
Disclosure ofunauthorized information where information is stolen during data
transmission and altered.
Unwarranted actions by personnel.
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Client Server
w^
Initiates a connection.
m Responds by sending the
client the digital LD
requested.
^
w^
Verifies server digital LD.
w^
Authenticates server digital
LD and sends an encrypted
session key issued by the
server
^ w^
Once authentication is
confirmed by both client
and server secure
communications is active
w
Figure 23 - Example of an Encrypted Client/Server Communication Session
Often organizations may require additional certificate authorities. A hierarchy ofCA's
can be deployed where the original certificate is the root certificate and the most trusted
(certificate issued by a
3r
party commercial vendor). These additional CA's are
subordinates to the root CA andmay issue additional certificates as needed. The reasons
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for adding additional CA's within an organization span from organization support for
administrative functions to maintenance functions of specific security applications that
need separation form other applications. Creating a trust that is supported by the same
CA can also create certificate relationships to work across organizations and can be
issued through a variety of transport mechanisms.
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IP Security Architecture
LPSec, as defined by the LETF, uses two OSI network layer security protocols: the AH
and the ESP protocols. The AH protocol provides a source for authentication and data
integrity and ESP provides a source for confidentiality, as well as authentication and data
integrity. These services operate only in a way that is recognized by the parties engaged
in information sharing activities. It is generally given that if the data informationwas
authenticated in transit, the message recipient is assured that the information is intact
withoutmodification.
The impact ofnew-sophisticated software has created opportunities for intrusions to
occur in the LP protocol in increased numbers with expanding varieties of attacks. The
OSI network layer does not offer the protection needed, especially in the current version.
The original design never anticipated the hostility of the current network environment nor
did it realize the scale ofnetwork hackers and the level of sophistication that would be
used. It also was never designed to perform security services that it is clearly performing
in today's environment. While the original intent of the LP protocol was to transfer data
packets across the network, there were few inquiries made about what other computers or
devices on the same network were doing. An example might be a packet analyzer that
reads data packets in transit on the network. This is known as network sniffing or
eavesdropping. Susceptibility to passive data interception can vary according to the
protocol structure and data packet design used, but common data transfer channels are
probably at the highest risk for attacks. An example of attacks commonly seen with
common data transfer channels is utilizing LP addresses for authentication purposes. This
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kind ofpractice has led to system security vulnerabilities such as client flooding
(overwhelming a client with responses), false cache loading, and server attacks that
overwhelm the server with tasks and should be avoided in network security design.
Encryption of the data transfer is one of the primaryways to help circumvent intrusions.
There are several methods 28 that can be used:
Link Level Encryption - the data packet is automatically encrypted at
transmission time over unsecured channels, then un-encrypted at the receiving
end.
End-to-end Encryption - the data packet stream is automatically encrypted at the
encryption router at transmission time, then un-encrypted at the receiving end
router.
Application Level Encryption - data packet encryption is done at the application
layer of the TCP/LP and OSI protocols.
The frequency of Internet attacks and lack of security imposed in the IPv4 protocol has
yielded recommendations that the IPv6 protocol include greater authentication and
encryption capabilities. Deployment of the 128 bit-addressing scheme of the IPv6
protocol will probably take years to implement, so many TCP/LP and OSI network
security improvements have been designed and implemented for the current IPv4
protocol.
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These enhancements include:
Improvements to remote site connectivitywhere organizations can utilize the
Internet, yet maintain Intranet security by communicating throughVPN.
Encryption technology ofLPSec architecture can also be utilized byVPN's.
Reliable and trusted key exchanges for data transfer that provides authentication
and confidentiality in applications surrounding e-commerce business ventures.
Extranet connectivity that provides authentication and confidentiality in
applications that apply to business ventures outside an organization's network.
Remote access services that are provided by ISP's over phone or cable lines.
With LPSec working below the TCP/LP transport layer, it can provide enterprise-wide
security protection that would normally be provided by specific security software
applications. According to Phillip G. Schein,
29
the LPSec architecture has many
advantages because of its invisibility to the TCP/LP Application layer and end user
(Figure 24).
Full support for the IETF industry
standards
Network interoperability is guaranteed by
providing an open industry standard as
opposed to LP encryption technologies
Flexible security protocols and polices Easily implemented in existing network
protocols
Transparent to applications and end
users
Works with the LP network layer and is
invisible to end user applications
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Authentication Strong encryption technologies enable
strong defense against attacks
Confidentiality Information technology security controls
that can prevent unauthorized access
during data transfer
Data Integrity LP authentication headers and variations of
hashmessaging authentication code
ensures data integrity exchanges
Dynamic Re-keying Dynamic re-keying during data transfer
increases security prevention by
eliminating interception
Secure end-to end linking Provides secure end-to-end linking that
helps ensure data integrity after transfer of
information
Ease of implementation and
administrativemaintenance
Reduced administrative management is
required because of the security filters and
policies employed with LPSec
architectures
Scalability LPSec architectures have the ability to
enact policies at a single user workstation
through an enterprise wide network
Figure 24 - LPSec Architecture Advantages
In order for a LPSec connection to take place, there needs to be a negotiation between
devices that agree on encryption algorithms, key generation methods andwhatever
security protocols are going to be used. This is known as an SA and is responsible for the
terms of the data transfer and the associated protocols that will be engaged during the
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transfer. The SA defines the security protocol that will be used when datagrams are sent
to a specific LP address. When information is sent, a packet descriptormode is identified
within the specified protocol. For example, the SA might identify the protocol as
transport. SA's identify one-way traffic, so if the transmission is bi-directional, then two
SA's would be required, one for each direction. Basically, the SA identifies a specific
security protocol that is carrying a specific encryption service in one specified direction.
If a particular data transmission session is carrying more than one protocol, the SA's will
form a bundle, which do not have the same LP address destination. This means that part of
the SA in an SA bundle might indicate that the AH protocol will support a specific
application like a firewall, and another part of the SA might indicate that the ESP
protocol will support another specific application behind the firewall.
There are different types of security protocols that are used and operate at different layers
of the TCP/LP or OSI protocols. For instance, Secure Channel services operate at the
transport layer and provide security services to specific applications like Web browsers
and applications. The security risk entails authentication of the web browser, web client,
and service provider. Secure Channel protocols deliver end-to-end security, beginning
with SSL and TSL. These protocols rely on public key authentication. SSL, originally
developed byNetscape, allows encrypted information between a web browser and web
server using public key encryption and digital certificates. TSL is a standard that has
essentially the same features as SSL. Other security protocols described earlier such as
AH and ESP provide lower level security services similar to Secure Channel services.
AH services provide authentication and data integrity by performing integrity checks on
each LP datagram that is sent. AH does not offer confidentiality as a service, but ESP does
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along with the other services that are provided by AH. LPSec provides all three services,
authentication, data integrity verification, and confidentiality at each end of the data
transfer. Another example of a security protocol is HTTPS, developed in 1995 by
Enterprise Integration Technologies. This is a secure protocol used with TCP and
provides web browser end-to-end secure connections over the Internet.
When a security system is being developed for a specific network, a list of security
policies needs to be established that lists various negotiation protocol policies that will be
needed to effectively enable that security strategy. By analyzing the exchanges ofdata
over a period of time, negotiation protocol policies can be determined for any appropriate
security services for that particular network configuration. An LP security policy may be
assigned to a specific network and when activated will automatically load these security
policies. This helps lower administrative costs by eliminating many of the tasks an
administrator would have to manually perform on each workstation. Generally, each one
of these security policies contains rules, which have an associated filters list and actions.
These security rules are composed of components (Figure 25) that match up with target
computers to define network traffic actions.
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IP Filter List Data Packets are Defined by IP Address
FilterActions Specific actions that permit, block, and
negotiate data transfer are identified when
the target packet matches the filter
information in the filter list
SecurityMethods Data is exchanged using three levels of
security intensity - high, medium, and
custom. The highmethod uses ESP and has
services such as confidentiality,
authentication, and integrity. The medium
level uses AH and has services such as
confidentiality, and integritywith no
encryption. The custom level allows for
creation of an integrity algorithm with or
without using encryption, and session key
settings.
Authentication Methods Defines the trust between devices. It can be
Kerberos, Digital Signatures, CA, or some
predefined key that only the associated
parties know of.
Tunnel Settings Specifies the "data packet inside another
datapacket"format that is transmitted in
the transport layer and provides end-to-end
security in network systems that lie outside
a typical LAN environment.
Connection Types Specifies where the data transmission will
pass; over the entire network or LAN's
Figure 25 - Components thatmatch with Target Computers to
Define Network Traffic Actions
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Filter actions include the source and destination LP addresses, clients, network identifiers,
or specific DNS names on amatching network. The filter actions permit (no security
actions are taken with the transfer ofdata), block (all data traffic is denied), and negotiate
security (must be compatible with a security protocol) and are applied as soon as a
connection is established within a specified protocol. If an action cannot be completed,
then the next defaulted action will be applied. Ifno action takes place, then the specified
service will fail to execute the specified security policy.
As seen, there are many different protocols for different network scenarios and
applications that need to be evaluated before implementing a security system. SSL and
TLS, along with Unix sockets (SOCKS), and HTTPS, along with others, can provide
network securitywith applications that are directly interacting with the TCP/LP and OSI
Transport layers. These protocols provide complimentary services within VPN's and
extranets that support secured exchanges of information by authenticating data transfers.
Private and trusted networks enable security through isolation. They can be secure, but
are limited in terms of scalability because of the initial investment needed to set them up
andmaintain them. End-to-end security systems can be more functional than private
networks because they are utilizing technologies and protocols from support services that
are applied to each layer of the network. This simplifies administration andmaintenance
issues and lends itself to a reduced cost base while being able to implement security
services integrated directlywith the specified applications needed for the network.
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Human Interaction
Even though viruses can be detected and removed, there are other aspects that need to be
addressed to completely understand the issues. All viruses and security issues are the
result of some form ofhuman interaction. They need to be written, verified, and placed
into an environment where they can do their damage. Viruses are created for amultitude
ofreasons such as the technological challenge of creating one that is unique,
undetectable, and disastrous to the end user. There are other reasons such as vanity where
the creator will become knownwithin their world, becoming notorious when anti-virus
software is required as a solution. Others can range from testing a code writer's ability to
watching a virus spread, to creating a virus that makes a specific point where people will
be forced to listen. The reasons are numerous, but the end results can be devastating.
According to Sarah Gordon,
31
renown expert in computer viruses and security
technology, "The kind ofperson who creates such disruption differs in age, income,
location, social/peer interaction, educational level, likes, dislikes and communication
style."She continues with the stereotypical image of a virus creator, the schoolboywho
has the tools to do it and something to prove, still exists, but here is, however, an
increasingly dark side to the virus writer. Motivated by financial gain, they are more and
more likely to be working with Spam creators and hackers. The money is coming from
these code writers and they seem to be employing the best ofvirus writers to help them.
"It sounds like a conspiracy theory, but they are becoming very advanced now in
organized hi-tech criminal activity".
32 This is evident in Sobig F, which turns a computer
into a host to send out millions ofSpam e-mails, often without the owner's knowledge.
With the clampdown on unsolicited e-mail, which now accounts for a large percentage of
106
e-mail traffic, Spam creators need to find new ways to continue their work. As much as
there is a thrill for virus creation, there remains a profit to be made from a successful
virus. AndyBissett and Geraldine Shipton 33 at the University of Sheffield believe it is
much more complicated than that and have identified both unconscious and conscious
motives behind virus writers. Such conscious motives include "non-specific
malice,"
revenge, cyber-espionage and commercial sabotage. Regardless of the reasons, virus
programmers are not going away.
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Hackers
Virus writers come frommany different backgrounds, but can generally be described in
the following social groups. Socially accepted people who write viruses in order to make
the public aware of security flaws in software. Others, known simply as Hackers are
people who are intelligent, yet like the challenge. Crackers are the people who break into
systems with the intent to do damage. Regardless ofwhat group a writer may fall into,
he/she has his/her specific agenda that, essentially, is tasked to bringing computer
operation to a standstill. They prey on human weakness to achieve their goals. "It's the
trust factor you are exploiting," said Oliver Friedrichs,
34
senior research manager with
anti-virus vendor Symantec Corp told The Associated Press. "Most people, when they
receive something, theywant to trust it. You don't want to miss something people may be
sending
you."
Ryan Schuster 35 defines Hackers and Crackers in the following way:
Hackers: The term "Hacker" dates back to the very beginning of the computer
age. At that time being called a Hackerwas something positive. Hackers possess
advanced computer skills and are considered intelligent without bounds. They live
by the belief that anything that teaches us something new and betters our lives
should be free. Their intent on "hacking" into a system or writing a virus is
benign. A virus written by a Hacker is often created for fun, or to learn something
new, or to impress other people. A Hacker virus usually has no discernable
destructive payload and often the virus never enters mainstream because the
Hacker turns it over to security firms as a lab virus. Other groups ofHackers have
a specific intent. They "hack" into computer systems or write viruses to make a
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point. Often they are the people we hear about who explain their actions by saying
that corporate America refused to listen to them about dangerous security holes,
so it was up to them to gain everyone's attention. These coders may write a virus
that is often a "concept" virus in that it blatantly displays previously undisclosed
security holes that a virus can use to infect. However, there is another side that
may seek out one group ofpeople or a certain company that they feel is unjust in
someway. A virus created in this vain for example, may only attack people with
"@microsoft.com"
e-mail addresses or sites with
".gov"
extensions.
Crackers, on the other hand, have a destructive intent. Like Hackers, they believe
they should have access to anything theywant. They get a thrill from destruction
and they get high from the chase as world governments and big business hunt
them down. They consider the old Hacker's Code OfEthics to be corny (or at the
very least outdated). A Cracker virus often actively seeks destruction. The
W32/Naked virus is a good example of a Cracker virus that attempted to destroy
all data. Crackers can be users who illegally hack into files/servers and load
automated programs that can run independently of the user's commands once
activated. These people designed these programs for the sole purpose ofbreaking
into computer systems and networks. They would send messages to vulnerable
servers, which would cause the host computer to respond. The amount of required
responses would effectively block any legitimate traffic. Creating automated
programs is illegal when their intentions are to harm other systems.
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Coding Ethics
Computer users and coders are responsible for adhering to accepted standards of ethical
behavior. Any unethical use of resources information, software, or hardware can be
treated like any other ethical violation. Computer information should be treated the same
as any piece ofproprietary information, regardless if it is business or personal property.
Viewing and using information such as programs, files or any other software data without
authorized permission is an invasion ofprivacy and can be punishable by law. Other acts
such as modifying information and preventing or delaying access to resources are
considered acts ofdestruction. These types of ethical standards also apply, even when
information is left unprotected.
Every establishment, whether business or personal, has its own set of rules or guidelines
that need to be followed. There are also other organizations such as the Association of
ComputingMachineryACM that has guidelines of ethical professional conduct expected
to be followed by its members. One of its main principles is to avoid harm to others.
"Harm"
means injury or negative consequences, such as the undesirable loss of
information, loss ofproperty, property damage, or unwanted environmental impacts. This
principle prohibits use of computing technology in ways that result in harm to any of the
following: users, the general public, employees, and employers. Harmful actions include
intentional destruction ormodification of files and programs leading to serious loss of
resources or unnecessary expenditure ofhuman resources such as the time and effort
required to purge systems of "computer viruses." Code writers who create viruses with
the intent to do harm are subject to the local and federal laws that apply.
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Spreading ofViruses
As discussed earlier, attacks are used to exploit weaknesses within the TCP/LP protocol or
associated protocols. Packets of information send data from a sending address to a
receiving address. The information that contains sending and receiving addresses utilizes
the LP portion of the protocol. The remainder of the data transfer is handled by the TCP
protocol. Data communication at the sender and receiver requires a port where the
information can enter or exit the computer. These ports have specified numbers that
determine the type of information the sender wants to transmit to the receiver. For
example, port 21 is used for FTP, port 25 is used for SMTP, and port 80 is used for
HTTP.
With normal client/server communications over secure connections, amessage is sent to
a server from the client that needs to be authenticated. When the server receives the
message, it authenticates it and returns an acceptance to the sender, thereby allowing
access to the server. In Denial of Service attacks, these requests are code, or scripts
created specifically for the purpose of searching for vulnerabilities in systems that will
allow installation and implementation. Once these scripts have been installed on an
unprotected computer, they can be executed at any time by generating large numbers of
requests to a server. These requests have invalid return addresses, sometimes using the
server address as the return address. The lack of a valid return address does not allow the
server to authenticate and respond back to the incoming requests. Depending upon the
server configuration setup, a specific amount of time will elapse before the sever will
close the connection. Upon receipt of the closed connection, the attacks begin tying up
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the server continuously as it attempts to authenticate all the incoming requests. The
number of requests can be so large that they tie up or crash the server resources,
effectively disabling it.
Detection of a virus can sometimes be tricky. Unless an anti-virus program detects and
removes it, a virus may go unnoticed for a period of time, infecting local programs and
applications. Depending upon the virus type, they can impact different aspects of your
system in different ways. The common thread is that they are transmitted through the
Internet transmissions and can impact, depending upon the transmission protocol, system
data and end user applications. Examples of these viruses include Boot, File, Macro, TSR
(Terminate and Stay Resident), andWindows. The basic startup operations of a computer
allow the specific virus to load and execute. These startup operations essentially consist
of the computer at startup going to the boot sector of the hard disk to obtain information
about the disk such as its physical characteristics, any pertinent information regarding
how the disk is partitioned, and specific instructions on loading the operating system.
Once these instructions are received, the operating system initializes and begins computer
operations. The operating system then accesses the FAT to find the specific addresses of
files needed to perform its operations. Essentially, the virus will attach itself to a file
when that file is opened, viewed, or executed. They then launch themselves as soon as the
computer boots from the hard drive. Typically, denial of service viruses impact three
, 38
mam places:
1 . Boot sector of the hard drive:
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These types ofviruses attack the boot sector of a floppy disk or the boot sector of
a hard disk. The main aspect of a boot virus is centered on the algorithms used at
startup of an operating system at power up. When an operating system has
initialized and passed all its startup tests (all operating systems perform system
tests to validate operational hardware and software), the system begins to read the
first physical sector of the boot disk. The first physical sector of the boot disk is
dependent upon how the BIOS are setup. For example, if the BIOS are setup to
read the CD-ROM first, the boot sector analyzes the BPB, which identifies the
operating system file addresses, reads them into system memory, and begins to
execute them. If these files are not present in the operating system, the boot sector
will identify this as an error and request a change to the boot disk. This startup
process also occurs if the system boots to the hard disk. In this case, the startup
routine is placed in the master boot record, which analyzes the disk partition table,
identifies the addresses in the C drive and loads this information into memory. As
in the case of the CD- ROM, if these files are not present in the operating system,
the boot sector will identify this as an error and request a change to the boot disk.
The original virus code was contained in a file or attachment that the user
downloaded and copied onto the disk or loaded directly to the users hard drive.
The startup operations become infected because the code used to run these
programs is transferred to the virus code, which is then executed upon operating
system startup. As the system initializes, the virus forces the software to read its
code and not the original system boot code. A diskette virus is loaded by the
diskette and overwrites the startup boot sector code with the malicious code.
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These viruses typically corrupt the first free boot sector of the disk, but can target
other areas of the disk if the size of the virus is larger than the original target
sector of the disk. In this case, the virus can then occupy the first free sector space
it finds. The following diagram (Figure 26) according to the Metropolitan
Network BBS Inc., 39 depicts an example ofan uninfected disk and an infected
disk.
Clean Disk
0 1 2 ... (sectorNo)
+ + + +- .+ + + + + +.
+ + + + + + + + + +.
+-- Boot sector or Master Boot Record
Infected disk (replaced boot/MBR)
0 12 ...
+ + + + + + + + + +
|XXXXX| | | | | |XXXXX|XXXXX|XXXXX|
+ + + + + + + + + +._.
+-- Virus top
+-- The rest ofvirus
+ Original Boot orMaster Boot Record
Infected disk (modified address of active boot sector)
0 12 ...
+ + + + + + + + +_..
|....X| | | | |XXXXX|XXXXX|XXXXX|
+ + + + + + + + +---
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+-- Modified ++ + +
Disk Partition Table +-- Main virus code
Figure 26 - Diagram According to the Metropolitan Network BBS Inc.
Depicting an Uninfected Disk and an Infected Disk
Each virus family has specific ways in which it acts on system boot sectors. Brain
and Ping Pong viruses analyze file allocation tables, marking specific sectors as
bad and forcing the startup algorithms to use the virus coding instead of the
original coding in the boot sector. The Stoned family ofviruses moves the
original boot sector to other parts of the hard disk, allowing them to install then-
code in the now available open sector space. Other viruses such as the Asuza
viruses contain their ownMBR loader in the body of their code and, after
infecting the boot sectors, replace theirMBR loader with the original piece of
coding. These types ofviruses can be overcome by overwriting the existing boot
sector code with an uninfected system disk. They can be more difficult to find and
remove if the virus is encrypted or uses other programs to initialize calls to the
boot sectors. These types ofviruses can cause loss ofhard disk sector information
in the Disk Partition Table, possibly requiring the hard disk to be reformatted to
correct the virus problem.
2. Create a bad sector where the virus writes itself to a sector on the hard disk, then
using the FAT table, marks that sector as bad so the specific program utilities will
not use that sector.
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3. Command.com, which contains the basic commands that the operating system
uses to access files. 40
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Profits from Viruses Propagation
There is another aspect ofvirus creation and their impending spread throughout the
computer world that needs to be addressed. Virus creation from Hackers and Crackers,
etc. is commonly known as an issue. These people create the virus code for various
reasons, but there is always the lesser-known perspective that there may be money to be
made from a virus. Large corporations such as anti-virus corporations make theirmoney
from selling anti-virus software to their customers. These customers are your average
homeowners and also large corporations. If a virus spreads to a corporation and disrupts
their day-to-day operations, the potential for large monetary losses exist. Rob
Rosenberger, 41 who is well-known in the anti-virus community for dispelling myths
gives the following account in his article, "McAfee's Media-Assault Tactics" regarding
large corporation tactics. "Did you knowMcAfee Associates pays employees to find
flaws in competitors' products? This fact came to light whenMcAfee launched a new
volley ofmedia assaults against Symantec and Dr. Solomon's Software, two major rivals
in the anti-virus market. In the first case, McAfee's beta-test division discovered an
obscure flaw in Symantec's Norton Utilities. Instead ofnotifying Symantec, McAfee
chose to notify only the media. They even wrote a blatant demonstration program so
Windows Sources magazine could include it as part of a fear-inducing online story.
Symantec believes McAfee should have notified them instead ofhelping the media write
stories about a trivial flaw. Productmanager Tom Andrus told the Associated Press, "We
were taken aback that theywould go to the press, create something akin to a virus and
then basically show the world how to do that."
42 Symantec also beratedWindows
Sources for providingMcAfee's code to anymalicious hackerwho wanted it.
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Editors pulledMcAfee's blatant demo from theWindows Sources website the next day.
Symantec quickly released a software patch to calm the nerves of frightened customers -
and paid PRNewswire to distribute an extremely polite press release announcing the
patch. In the second case, McAfee's beta-test division discovered a supposed "cheat
mode" in Dr. Solomon's Anti-Virus Toolkit. McAfee went on the warpath, paying
PRNewswire to distribute a press release accusing Solomon's of committing heinous
crimes against humanity. "The cheatmode can cause Dr. Solomon's Anti-Virus Toolkit
to show inflated virus detection results when the product is being reviewed by trade
publications or independent third party testing organizations. McAfee has forwarded its
evidence to the National Computer SecurityAssociation". Solomon struck back with a
hilarious press release: "McAfee Pleads with Dr Solomon's to Reduce Dr Solomon's
Virus Detection Rate." They proudly admit their
"heuristic" function works exactly as
described. "The product given to reviewers is exactly the same product delivered to
customers. The technology is available to every
user." McAfee responded with another
inflammatory press release claiming that Solomon had engaged in a "disinformation
campaign."
The article continues, but the important fact remains that two adversaries in the anti-virus
corporate world exploited the other's weaknesses for the benefit of themselves. It's
important to understand that, in a free market society, the bottom line for a business to
stay gainfully employed is to make a profit. As a competitor, itmakes complete sense not
to help others out, but from a consumer perspective, these may be examples ofhow big
business can work. It is possible to carry this mindset further to the point where the
possibility exists for anti-virus corporations to be at the root of some of these viruses, or
at leastwithhold specific information about impending viruses, because it is, after all,
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their bottom line that matters and selling anti-virus software to consumers and
corporations is what keeps them in business. According to ACM, "Computing
professionals have a responsibility to share technical knowledge with the public by
encouraging an understanding of computing, including the impact of computer systems
and their limitations. This imperative implies an obligation to counter any false views
related to computing."43 In the previous example, both these companies intentionally
disregarded this concept, ultimately showing that their priorities lie elsewhere.
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Role ofGovernment Agencies
The government recognizes that any forms of computer intrusions via unauthorized
access to computers with intentions thatmay ormay not be malicious are crimes that are
punishable by law. The problem of Internet security does not necessarily lie within the
control of the federal government andmay not specifically be a problem that is solved
through the criminal justice system, that is until the law has been broken. Internet security
has been essentially an issue for the private sector, and has been increasing its security
efforts to match the pace of technological changes. One of the issues that face today's
government agencies is whether or not the current laws are effective, or whether they
have been outdated by changes in technology. According to James X. Dempsey in his
testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee and the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
February 29, 2000, several proposals have been under consideration since before the
recent attacks to amend the computer crime statute and the electronic surveillance laws to
enhance law enforcement authorities. ** He indicates that the Subcommittees, after
careful analysis, may find that some modest changes are appropriate. "We urge caution,
especially in terms ofany changes that would enhance surveillance powers or
government access to information. Americans are already deeply concerned about their
privacy, especially
online."He goes on to say, "You must be careful to ensure that the
recent Internet attacks do not serve as justification for legislation or other government
mandates that will be harmful to civil liberties and the positive aspects of the openness
and relative anonymity of the Internet. Such a course is especially unjustifiedwhen there
is so much to be done to improve securitywithout changing the architecture or protocols
of the Internet or further eroding
privacy."45
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One of the issues seen in the current legal environment is that the standard for
government access to information does not completely protect the privacy of legitimate
computer users. Ifgovernment agencies dictate that any legislative changes are necessary
in response to Internet security issues, then those changes need to be balanced with
measures to improve privacy by tightening the standards for government surveillance and
access to information. 46 Security and privacy are intertwined and trying to improve
securitywithout addressing end user privacywill create an even greater gap between
imposing additional government regulations and the freedom of speech that the Internet
now extensively enjoys. This includes imposing additional regulations requiring better
records, allowing improvedmonitoring of Internet service providers. Theymay pose
risks to privacy andmay actually harm security in the longer term by impeding
technological growth and creating an even more explosive government interference
scenario.
In the same testimony, an example ofdenial of service attacks is used to illustrate how
the tools for these attacks, and the knowledge to create these attacks are well known
within the private community. By creating legislature to combat these issues without
being cautious about impacting personal rights, might create additional friction as the
general public might consider these measures invasive. These attacks target e-commerce
web sites with phonymessages requiring the targeted computers to respond, thereby
creating an atmosphere where legitimate traffic cannot get through. The tools for
warning, diagnosing, and preventing Internet attacks are in the hands of the general
public. Because this type of crime is very different from what we refer to as typical
crimes, government agencies are limited in their responses, both in the ability to catch the
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perpetrators and in the ability to do so in a timely fashion. The issue itself is that the
original concept of the Internet was an open architecture-sharingmedium, with little or
no securitymeasures incorporated into its design. There are actions government agencies
can take to help incorporate improved securitywithin the Internetwithout impacting
personal freedoms.
James X. Dempsey has suggested in the following in his testimony, "The government
should do more to support basic research and development in computer security."He also
asks, "What changes in law, if any, would likely have deterred ormade it easier to
investigate and prosecute the denial of service attacks, or other exploitations of Internet
vulnerability?"47 He indicates that there are three major laws setting privacy standards
for government interception of communications and access to subscriber information that
need updating to reflect new technological advances.
1 . The federal wiretap statute ("Title III"), 1 8 USC 25 10 et seq., requiring a probable
cause order from a judge for real-time interception ofvoice and data
communications
2. The Electronic Communications PrivacyAct of 1986 (ECPA), 18 USC 2701 et
seq., setting standards for access to stored electronic communications and
transactional records (subscriber identifying information, logs, toll records)
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3. The pen register and trap and trace statute, enacted as part ofECPA, 1 8 USC
3121 et seq., governing real-time interception of "the numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted on a telephone line."
He also points out in the following list that existing laws provide inadequate protection.
1 . The standard for pen registers (which collect phone dialing information in real
time) is minimal - judges must rubber stamp any application presented to them.
2. Many of the protections in the wiretap law, including the special approval
requirements and the statutory rule against use of illegally obtained evidence, do
not apply to email and other Internet communications.
3. Data stored on networks is not afforded full privacy protection.
4. ISP customers are not entitled to notice when personal information is subpoenaed
in civil lawsuits; notice ofgovernment requests can be delayed until it is too late
to object.
5. Amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to allow federal investigation and
prosecution in cases where the total damage is less than $5,000. The Act already
allows accumulation of loss to cover hacks that cause a small amount ofdamage
to a large number of computers so long as the total damage in the course of any 1-
year period is at least $5,000.
6. Authorize judges in one jurisdiction to issue pen register and trap and trace orders
to service providers anywhere in the country.
7. Increasing computer crime prosecutions bymodifying a sentencing directive
requiring amandatoryminimum sentence of six months in prison for violations.
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8. Make juveniles 1 5 years of age and older eligible for federal prosecution in cases
where the Attorney General certifies that such prosecution is appropriate.
9. Add computers located outside the United States to the definition ofprotected
computers.
10. Add forfeiture of any property used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate
the crime to the penalties and forfeiture of any device used to copy a computer
program or other item to which a counterfeit label is affixed.
11. Permit interception without a court order upon consent of an operator ofa system
when the system is the subject of attack.
The issues surrounding these enhancements do reflect upon the privacy of individuals.
These issues are being addressed to the point where any legislation proposed will need to
be balanced in proportion to the privacy of the Internet user. Some of these enhancements
include:
1 . Limit the pen register/trap and trace authority to improve further the privacy
protections adopted for pen register and trap and trace investigations.
2. Add electronic communications that respond by prohibiting the government from
using improperly obtained information about electronic communications.
3. Require notice and an opportunity to object when civil subpoenas seek personal
information about Internet usage.
4. Improve the notice requirements to ensure that consumers receive notice
whenever the government obtains information about their Internet transactions.
124
5. Limit sale and disclosure of transactional information about Internet usage
6. Clarifywhether Internet queries are content, which cannot be disclosed without
consent or legal process.
7. Provide enhanced protection for information on networks: probable cause for
seizure without prior notice, opportunity to object for subpoena access.
8. Limit authority for roving taps.
9. Establish probable cause standard for access to wireless phone location data in
real-time.
10. Enact clearer standard for interception of conference calls.
11. Extend to law enforcement interceptions overseas.
12. Privacy standards for government access to data collected by DNS registrars and
registries.
Essentially, the Internet security issue is a known problem. The solution, however, may
reside in the hands of the private end user rather than through government mandated
legislation. Buildingmore secure networks is largelywithin the realm of the companies
who create the software. New government legislation controls need to balance the
individual's privacywith enough assertion to help prevent and ultimately punish those
responsible for Internet violations.
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Vendor Support of IPv6
Today, IPv6 appeals to people and vendors alike in various networking industries,
research organizations, as well as military and government agencies in the United States
and abroad. Internet service providers worldwide will incorporate IPv6 as market
requirements mature and adoption continues to growwith systems at home that are, and
will be connected to, a network that will require an enormous increase ofglobal LP
addresses. Growing demands for wireless Internet addresses, and expanding development
in integrating Internet connectivity into devices such as automobiles and appliances will
result in the demand for IPv4 addresses to exceed supply. IPv6 overcomes this, as well as
other IPv4 limitations, by expanding addresses to 128 bits and offering other
functionality to support future growth. According to Agilent Technologies, "In order to
migrate networks to IPv6, network equipment developers and service providers must
ensure that core routers and networks can support both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic during the
transitional period. In addition, core network routers must be able to deliver IPv6
forwarding at wire rates, without sacrificing performance or reliability. IPv6 core routers
must also support IPv6 routing protocols, as well as migrationmechanisms such as
tunneling, dual stacks and protocol translation".
49 The advantages to migrating to IPv6
are numerous. Examples include deploying IPv6 on existing production networks,
increased end user problem resolution capabilities that incorporate additional third party
solutions, and additional features that can be incorporated by new software upgrades.
These features will offer increased services for current firewall, web browser, server, and
desktop applications. There are also additional advantages that can be currently employed
by vendors. IPv6 products currently being released are architected to be deployed on the
current IPv4 production networks. These products offer increased problem resolution
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support between the vendor and end user, along with increased web browser, server,
firewall, and desktop capabilities. These services can be provided by software upgrades
to the product, which allow vendors to begin deploying an IPv6 infrastructure. This
becomes advantageous to the vendors because these mechanisms were designed to be
interoperable with the current IPv4 infrastructure. Because itmay take many years for the
existing IPv4 infrastructure to be replaced, vendors will ship their products with dual
capabilities of supporting both IPv4 and IPv6. There are exceptions to this in specific
markets such as cell phones and Internet appliances. 50 These markets are releasing their
product lines utilizing IPv6 technologies only. Currently though, these are emerging
technology based products using IPv6 because they do not have applications that are
using older IPv4 applications.
Third party software companies such as Cisco Systems have adapted to deliver additional
standards-compliant IPv6 features and solutions across multiple platforms. 51 Cisco
software, for example, will deliver broad and advanced IPv6 routing capabilities to fully
utilize the latest in transmission protocol upgrades. According to Stephen Deering, Cisco
Fellow and lead designer, "While many vendors have been focused on delivering the
'wireless Internet' or the 'optical Internet,' Cisco has been working on integrating these
and other technologies into the current Internet. By building IPv6 into Cisco IOS
software, we are enabling continued growth of the Internet and its expansion into new
applications and capabilities in away thatmaintains compatibilitywith existing Internet
services. Furthermore, Cisco is the onlymajor networking vendor to deliver IPv6 across
multiple platforms, thus ensuring that our customers and partners can deploy IPv6 when
S9
and where
required."
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Deployment of IPv6 will still have unknowns associatedwith it for some time to come.
Large corporations will continue looking at their applications as the technology evolves.
March 4, 2003, the Beijing Internet Institute (BE), a leading global research and testing
facility, announced the results of the world's first public core router trial which is
designed to test IPv6 interoperability and performance. 53 This test had participants from
four network equipment developers, Fujitsu, Ltd., Hitachi, Ltd., JuniperNetworks, and
NEC Networks. The core routers tested were the Fujitsu GeostreamR920, the Hitachi
GR2000-20H, the JuniperNetworksM20, and the NEC CX5210. Agilent Technologies
provided test systems, IPv6 test methodologies, and technical support for the testing.
Using the Agilent Router Tester, BE conducted independent tests of each core router,
including routing protocol conformance testing, OC-48 IPv6 performance testing, IPv6
routing stress tests and BGP4+ and OSPFv3 interoperability tests, to verify the feasibility
of IPv6 deployment. Based on test results andmeasurements, all participating routers
successfully demonstrated the ability to support commercial IPv6 networks and provide
basic IPv6 capabilities, including support for IPv6 routing protocols, forwarding of IPv6
datagrams at wire rate, and IPv6 interoperability between the equipment tested. " This
eventmarks an important step forward in advancing the deployment of the next-
generation IPv6 protocol, and delivering the many benefits it brings to the world's core
networks,"
said HuaNing, chief technology officer ofBLI. "We were extremely pleased
to host China's first IPv6 test event and to make the results available to the world's
networking community. While this was not a comparative performance test ofdifferent
router vendors, we achieved our collective purpose by publicly verifying the feasibility of
IPv6
deployment." 54
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Other vendors have shown their support for IPv6 as seen at the 2001 Vendor exhibition
5"
in Japan. Examples of some of the software vendors IPv6 support intentions are:
1 . As already indicated, Cisco will support IPv6 in a distribution-type layer 3
switching solution designed to provide high-performance capabilities for its high-
end router series, with the ultimate goal ofbuilding a large-scale IPv6 backbone
network. They also intend to proceed with development for implementing IPv6
support in their switch products and for implementing hardware-based IPv6 high
speed forwarding.
2. FoundryNetworks plans on delivering a multi-phased approach for IPv6 solutions
including full IPv6 protocol routing support in their software. These high end
products provide reliable LP routing functions and deliver new functionality for
Ethernet solutions.
3. Juniper Networks routers are purpose-built to meet the challenges of the new LP
infrastructure used in critical applications such as core routing, dedicated access,
peering, and data center hosting by service providers.
Even with the current support of IPv6 technologies, there are inherent risks associated
with it. Businesses that are looking at IPv6 as a viable technology upgrade are concerned
with basic issues like cost, implementation, and support. There is also the concern of
knowing when there will be sufficientmarket penetration of the new technology to
consider rolling IPv6 capabilities on the existing core routers and switches. According to
Richard A. Steenbergen, in an article titled, "When IPv6 ... if ever?" he writes, "There are
two key problems which are preventing the widespread use of IPv6, LP Allocation, and
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network vendor support. Support for all hosts is actually one of the least of the
problems." Major business networks want to deploy IPv6, but are not sure of the proper
way of accomplishing it. "They certainly can't do it on their primary backbone links and
routers, the support from vendors is simply not there. Even if there was working code,
they wouldn't dare deploy it on their production network, the code is too unstable
(especially IPv6 routing protocols), and they risk looking unreliable in comparison to
those who don't even make the attempt to support IPv6." 56 Without the network there is
limited demand for high traffic IPv6, and without the demand there is little desire to build
the network. He questions, "Should they buy separate routers, try desperately to make
IPv6 work well on a spare 7200, and hope not to get a black eye from customers who
expect the same level of routine-ness we are experienced with in IPv4? Should they
provision more circuits because of this? Build a parallel network supporting IPv6,
without a current customer demand? Or do they say, "We'll wait until the vendors get it
right?" These are valid points. Also to be considered is the fact that IPv4 is currently
running at an effective level of stability and speed and the new IPv6 infrastructure may
take time to achieve current IPv4 levels ofperformance. If, in fact, this is true, then
infrastructure supportmay also be lagging behind. Technological advances are, in part,
based on customer demand and, if the demand is somewhat minimalized by the end user
community that would slow down development from vendors. As much as there will
always be issues surrounding the deployment ofnew technologies, eventually new
software technologies, or next generation technologies such as IPv6, will be incorporated
into the Internetmainstream.
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Conclusion
The major thrust of IPv6 is to address security issues by incorporating embedded security
technology that can solve many of the common privacy and encryption problems to
which the current IPv4 is subjected. A conclusion can be drawn that LPv6's enhanced
security functionality does solve many of the current known issues that surround IPv4
architecture, but will not be able to solve all of them.
Advances in technology, along with the rapid spread of Internet usage by consumers, has
forced changes in the way computer use and its associated applications are now
architected. This is evident with new software programs such as online banking that are
being integrated into everyday activities. These changes have also brought with them the
downside of increased network breaches and intrusions. Computer security has become a
major concern to businesses and individuals who use this technology as a way of life.
These programs have become easy targets for intrusions because of their easy
accessibility on the Internet.
Data intrusions can occur along many areas of a network, from interception of data
transfers at access points such as routers, to gaining permission to account information
such as root passwords, thereby allowing intruders the ability to overwrite existing boot
files and take control of the system. Early intrusions simply exploited poor system design
to gain access to system files. Intruders understood that networked systems were
designed with default settings in place, making access relatively easy. Considerations to
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incorporate security into system design were not practical because administrators did not
have the resources or tools to activelymonitor their networks for any unwanted activity.
It became clear that the current IPv4 architecture needed to be changed to reflect the need
for better network security. IPv4, designed initially for use in educational and research
endeavors to exchange electronic datawithout regard to network security, incurredmany
upgrades into its architectural scheme to help combat existing shortcomings. With these
upgrades came more complex security breaches as intruders began migrating to source
code, looking for weaknesses in programs. Security upgrades, such as encryption
technology helped secure data, but were only patches to cover the deeper problems. The
correct fix was IPv6, a new Internet architecture that incorporated the embedded
technology needed to enhance security to meet today's security demands.
IPv6 addresses many of the IPv4 shortcomings. IPv6 increases the addressing
capabilities to a 128-bit addressing scheme, from the 32-bit addressing scheme used in
IPv4. This greatly increases the number of addressable nodes, reducing the potential
problem of running out of LP addresses. Security enhancements such as LP Authentication
Header, and LP Encapsulating Security Payloadmechanisms were also included in the
core design. These features incorporated into the core architectural design of IPv6, allow
for increased data authentication and integrity by verifying the data sent in a transmission
will be received intact and unchanged.
There are though, other issues that need to be addressed when looking at security
intrusions in a networked system. It is not the technical aspect of software coding or the
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hardware components that connect the network, but the human aspect that creates the
intrusions. Exploiting a computer system to gain access to sensitive data is for some a
challenge to see if it can be done, and for others, it represents a statement ofdefiance to
try to do something we are told we cannot. A business that proclaims their networked
system is secure just may pose enough of a challenge for an intruder to attempt access.
As technological changes continue to develop, security techniques required to protect
network system infrastructures will continue to become more complex to ward off
increasingly complex attacks to existing known vulnerabilities. The continued problem is
these security fixes incorporated into today's applications will not resolve the network
breaches from advanced technology gains tomorrow because the intruder's knowledge
will become more sophisticated, especially as they gain increased understanding of
network integration, system operations, and architectural protocol design. Elimination of
these types of attacks will only occur when the incentive for intruders has changed to the
point where reward or gain, either personal or financial, has been eliminated.
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Acronyms
Note: Unless otherwise noted these are the acronyms used in this paper.
ACM Association ofComputingMachinery
AD - Area Directors
AH - Authentication Header
ANS - Advanced Network Services
ANSI - AmericanNational Standards Institute
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASCH - American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BLND - Berkley Internet Name Domain
BIOS - Basic Input/Output System
BPB - BIOS Parameter Block
CA - Certificate Authority
CD-ROM - Compact Disk - Read OnlyMemory
DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DES - Data Encryption Standard
DNS - Domain Name System
DSL - Digital Subscriber Line
EBCDIC - Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code
ESP - Encapsulating Security Payload
FAT - File Allocation Table
FTP - File Transfer Protocol
Gbps - Giga-bytes per second
HTTPS - Secure Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
LAB Internet Architecture Board
LANA - Internet AssignedNumbers Authority
ICMP - Internet Control Message Protocol
LE - Lnternet Explorer
LESG - Internet Engineering Steering Group
LETF - Internet Engineering Task Force
IGMP - Internet GroupManagement Protocol
LP - Internet Protocol
LPSec - Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 - Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 - Internet Protocol version 6
ISDN - Integrated Services Digital Network
ISO - International Standards Organization
ISOC - Lnternet Society
LSP - Internet Service Provider
ITUT - International Telecommunication Union- Telecommunications Standardization
Sector
LAN - Local AreaNetwork
LPD - Line Printer Daemon
MAC - Media Access Control
Mbps - Mega-bytes per second
MBR - Master Boot Record
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MD5 - Message Digest 5
MDAC - Microsoft Data Access Components
MLB - Management Information Base
NAP - Network Access Points
NFS - Network File System
NLPC - National Lnfrastructure Protection Center
NSF - National Science Foundation
OSI - Open Systems Interconnection
PDU - Protocol Data Unit
PKI - Public Key Infrastructure
RFC - Request for Comment
RLP - Routing Information Protocol
RPC - Remote Procedure Calls
SA - Security Association
SANS Institute -
S/MLME - Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
SMB - Server Message Block
SMTP - Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNA - Systems NetworkArchitecture
SNMP - Simple NetworkManagement Protocol
SSH - Secure Shell
SSL - Secure Socket Layer
STD -Standards
TCP - Transfer Communications Protocol
TCP/LP - Transfer Communications Protocol / Internet Protocol
TOS - Type of Service
TSL - Transport Layer Security
TTL - Time to Live
V6ops - Internet Protocol version 6 Operations Working Group
VPN - Virtual Private Network
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Embedded Security
Improvements to IPv6
Presentation Agenda
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- Internet Protocol
- IP Datagrams
- IPv4 Datagram
Presentation Agenda
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- IPv6
- Major Differences Between IPv4 and IPv6
- IPv6 Security Schemes
- IPv6 Datagram
- IPv4 vs. IPv6 AddressHeader Field Differences
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- Viruses
Security Controls
- LP Security Architecture
- Human Interaction
- Conclusion
Assertion Statement
IPv6's embedded security can solve many of the
common privacy and encryption problems to
which the current IPv4 is subject.
Project Scope
Define and analyze the TCP/IP communications
protocol in IPv4 and evaluate how the security
changes in IPv6 will overcome security
shortcomings
Introduction
Reasons for the IPv6 upgrades
- Security
- Functional Expandability
Need for Standardization
TCP/IP Standardization
Roles ofdevelopment organizations - IETF, IAB,
Working Groups (V6ops)
Working Group Charters
- Solicit input
- Provide feedback
- Publish informational RFCs that help developers
understand real world issues, identify security risks,
analyze deployment solutions, assume
responsibilities for IPv6 transition
Data Transfer
All forms ofdata transmission, either data, voice,
or video use electromagnetic signals transmitted
over their corresponding medium
- Data is converted from original source
(computer) into a signal (analog or digital),
transmitted overmedium, then reconverted into
original source
Communication Architectures
Manufacturers concepts for networking their
devices together. Examples include:
- Digital Network Architecture (DEC)
- AdvanceNet (HP)
- Distributed Systems Architecture (Honeywell)
- Internet Packet Exchange (Novell)
- Xerox Network Systems (XNS)
Allow a wide range of computermakes, models,
and operating systems to communicate across
networks. Examples include:
- TCP/IP
-OSI
OSI Model
Developed by ISO as a model to be used as a
guide for other protocols. Each layer (7) has its
own functionality
Layers were developed so specific data transfer
functions were distinct
Eventually replaced by TCP/IP because it did not
meet the anticipated growth of the Internet
Has corresponding layers to other protocols such
as TCP/IP
TCP/IP
Has become standard Internet framework for
communication protocols
Standardized by the IAB to maintain commonality
among protocols to connect different operating
systems
IAB made up of committees that issue standards
TCP/IP
Made up ofmultiple protocols
TCP - packages and prepares data for transfer.
Provides error recovery and data analysis
IP - establishes the framework needed for
successful data transfer using a common address
scheme to identify host computer and network
Has corresponding layers to other protocols such
as the OSI Model
TCP/IP
Current protocol encompasses five layers that
provide different tasks
- Application
- Transport
- Internet
- Network Access
- Physical
Internet Protocol
Computers installed on Internet through an ISP
requires an IP address that conforms to IP naming
conventions
Current IPv4 uses 32-bit addressing scheme
IP addresses are used to determine where network
traffic is to be routed
IP Datagrams
The data sent from a computer through a network
is known as an IP Datagram
These data units are divided into smaller units that
describe how the information is processed by the
IP protocol
IPv4 Datagram
IP Version Protocol
Header Length Header Checksum
TOS Source Address
Total Length Destination Address
Identifier Options
Flags Padding
Fragment Offset Data
Time-To-Live
IPv6
RFCs 1883-1886
Updated version from IPv4 that incorporates
changes in address space, improved network
architecture techniques, and incorporate greater
security
Many characteristics of IPv4 will temporarily
remain because ofdependencies with other
protocols
Seamless upgrade from IPv4
Major Differences Between IPv4
and IPv6
Expanded Addressing Capabilities
- Increase the LP address size from 32 bits to 128 bits
Header Format Simplification
- Simplified IPv4 header fields
Improved Support for Extensions
- More improved data forwarding and greater flexibility for future
functionality
Flow Labeling Capabilities
- New capabilities to label data packets
Authentication and Encryption Capabilities
Support for Data authentication, integrity, and confidentiality
IPv6 Security Schemes
IPv4 not designed with security in mind
IPv6 integrated two security schemes into lower
protocol layers
- IP Authentication Header
- IP Encapsulating Security Payload
IPv6 Datagram
IP Version Hop Limit
Priority Source Address
Flow Label Destination Address
Payload Length Data
Next Header
IPv4 vs. IPv6 Address Header
Field Differences
IPv4 IPv6
Version Identifier - 4 Version Identifier - 6
Header length field Payload length replaces IPv4 total
length field
TOS field Eliminates TOS field
Identification, flag, and fragment
offset fields
Eliminates identification, flag, and
fragment offset fields
Protocol field Remains in another extension
header
Time-To-Live Renamed to Hop Limit field
Header Checksum field Eliminated Header Checksum field
Options field Replaced with header extensions
Intrusions and Detections
Can occur in different areas of a network such as:
- Gaining access to root directories
- Network connection access as administrators
- Permissions to specific directories and users on
a network
Intrusions and Detections
Automated software programs used by intruders
have led to attacks becomingmore effective and
devastating. Tools include:
- Network scanners
- Password cracking tools
- Packet sniffers
- Trojan Horse programs
- Tools to modify system log files
- Tools to allow the attacker to remain anonymous
- Tools to modify system configuration files
Intrusions and Detections
Internet security intrusions can be broken down
into basic types:
- Probes
- Scan
- Malicious Code
- Denial of Service
- Account Compromise
- Packet Sniffer
- Root Compromise
- Exploitation ofTrust
Infrastructure Attacks
Viruses
Software programs designed to replicate and
spread themselves
Usually require host to allow them to propagate
Can have an impact on all programs, files, and
hard disks
Viruses
Examples of recognized virus types:
- Macro
- File Infector
- Multi-Partite
- Boot Sector
- Master Boot Records
Security Controls
Other forms of encryption and authentication
technologies are being implemented
- PKI verifies confidentiality and authenticity
between information sharing networks
- Certificate Authorities offer a digital trust
between parties that verify that sending and
receiving parties are who they claim to be
IP Security Architecture
Because it will take years to fully implement IPv6
128 bit addressing scheme, other improvements
are being deployed in IPv4
IPSec architecture uses two network layer security
protocols, AH and ESP and are recognized by all
sharing parties
- AH provides authentication and data integrity
- ESP provides confidentiality
Human Interaction
Understanding intrusion attacks requires an
understanding ofwhy the attacks occur
- Hackers / Crackers
- Coding Ethics
- Virus Propagation Profits
Role of government agencies
Vendor support of IPv6
Conclusion
Does IPv6 solve IPv4 security issues?
Where do we go next for security prevention?
